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1. INTRODUCTION
3Eonomi theory and the empirially observed behaviour of agents are
often hallenging to math beause of the rihness of aspets that inuene
the ating of eonomi agents. Theory, on the other hand requires a limited
number of learly dened dimensions to be able to derive stringent arguments
and onlusions. This work attempts to ontribute to eonomi researh by
attempting both to retrae the real-life behaviour of agents, to validate and
math ndings against existing theory as well as to ontribute to new theory.
Following a long standing tradition among researhers in industrial or-
ganization, as e.g. put forward by Tirole (2003), Chapter 2 presents results
from detailed ase study interviews in prourement in the automotive indus-
try, thus exploiting the broad array of aspets that any omplex empirial
problem has. Chapter 3 then presents a narrowly foussed eonometri anal-
ysis of one partiular aspet that has been identied in the previous ase
study interviews, based on a seond survey data set. Chapter 4 disusses
a theoretial work that is tehnially losely related to a well established
model in industrial organization, Hotelling, and applies this to the interna-
tional trade ontext. All hapters are self-ontained researh papers, and
every hapter is followed by its bibliography and appendix.
In Chapter 2, my o-authors, Florian Müller and Konrad Stahl, and I re-
port on the results of a series of ase study interviews with senior managers
of suppliers as well as input prourers in the German automotive industry.
With this researh we attempt to ll the gap between theory building and
empirial observation and testing, by introduing a ase study approah in
whih the disussed questions are based on theory, and the ontext in whih
they are raised is speied to an extent that allows the reexamination of
existent theory, and new theory building. Hypotheses to explain and to
evaluate the observed interations or to identify the need for further theo-
retial and empirial studies are derived. Among others, we nd that the
hold-up by suppliers is washed out by ontratual interdependene, and in
partiular by repetition. On the other hand, we assess upstream innovative
eorts to be ineiently small beause omplementarity eets as well as
eort results are not fully internalized. Further theoretial investigation re-
lated to induing innovation and the alloation of risks in the value hain
we onsider espeially interesting. A more detailed empirial analysis would
be justied, among others, onerning the dierenes in ontrating between
varying types of proured parts and the organization of manufaturing along
the value hain.
Chapter 3 sueeds the ase study interviews disussed in Chapter 2 and
onentrates on a single aspet in automotive prourement, delegation versus
entralization, based on a dierent, larger, and more foused set of data that
was generated in a survey of the German automotive industry. This industry
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is haraterized by several stages or tiers of prodution. Automotive man-
ufaturers (OEMs) in some instanes diretly negotiate with sub-suppliers
of their diret or tier 1 suppliers. This strategy is generally referred to as
direted business in the industry. I provide evidene on the use of direted
business and math the empirial evidene to the theory of delegation versus
entralization. Direted business, or entralization of ontrating, dereases
the informational rents of the tier 1 supplier as predited by theory. In ad-
dition, I show that direted business inludes higher development eort by
the OEM and (weakly) redues inentives of the tier 1 supplier to produe
suient quality.
Chapter 4 presents a model with dierentiated goods applied to the on-
text of international trade and is a joint work with Andrey V. Ivanov. The
literature related to the innoent bystander problem (Krugman, 1991) pre-
dits that when a subset of ountries enters into a free trade agreement
(FTA), the rest of the world suers in welfare. We present a trade model
with horizontally dierentiated goods, in whih in ontrast to the literature,
under some onditions the non-FTA-partiipating ountries an also gain in
welfare. The main drivers behind this positive result are the size asymme-
try of the ountries and the inability of rms to perfetly prie-disriminate
aross ountries.
Bibliography
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2.1 Introdution
Game and ontrat theories with their extensions to the design of alloation
mehanisms, and their appliations to the theories of the rm and indus-
try are arguably amongst the most interesting and inuential miroeonomi
theories that have emerged during the last thirty-ve years. Bringing these
theories to statistial data, however, suers from the problem that many as-
sumptions essential in driving the results are well beyond the detail aptured
in the data. Hene many theories remain unheked empirially.
An additional important faet is brought in by the fat that eient on-
trats or other mehanisms proposed by theory are often never implemented
in pratie, beause sophistiated mehanisms may be unneessary, infeasi-
ble, or too ostly to implement. In view of this, it seems important to see
whih mehanisms are atually used, to seek the reasons for apparent ine-
ienies, and possibly to improve on them. In other words, the development
of new theory in this realm should rest on assumptions that are based on em-
pirially founded generi statements, rather than on assumptions that are,
while plausible, often rather ad ho.
With the present researh we attempt to ll the gap between theory
building and empirial observation and testing, by introduing a ase study
approah in whih the ase questions disussed are based on theory, and
the ontext in whih they are raised is hopefully speied to an extent that
allows the reexamination of extant theory, and new theory building. The ase
data are generated from in-depth interviews of the management personnel
of German automotive produers' prourement divisions, as well as of the
personnel of upstream suppliers' R&D and sales divisions.
The automotive industry exhibits properties that rather ideally serve the
purpose. No other mass market onsumer produt is more omplex, and on-
sists of more individual produt spei parts, than a modern vehile. The
number of parties engaged in produing and ollating these parts is large,
and the interfaes between the parts are of a omplexity that neessitates
partiularly detailed oordination. Modern vehiles ontain an enormous
amount of innovative features in many tehnologial dimensions. Vehile
parts are idiosynrati to an extent that extremely few parts are used in any
two dierent vehile models, even if supplied by one automotive manufa-
turer (heneforth alled OEM, Original Equipment Manufaturer). All these
properties lead to ontratual relationships, in partiular between OEMs and
their diret suppliers, that span between very personal relational ontrats
and impersonal arms length relationships.
The automotive industry has hanged signiantly during the reent 15
years. Two features dominate. Firstly, the typial OEM's produt portfolio
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has broadened signiantly, to the extent that produt portfolios have be-
ome more similar. This, amongst other features, has substantially inreased
the intensity of ompetition between similar vehiles.
1
Seondly, the OEMs have outsoured signiantly. Yet at the same time
they also have redued the number of suppliers they are diretly dealing with.
New supplier types, alled system or module suppliers, have emerged. While
a system supplier is haraterized by integrating several omponents into a
funtioning system, module suppliers are merging neighboring omponents
that funtionally do not neessarily interat with eah other. Examples for a
system are the vehile eletronis, or the brake system integrating produts
from the brake pedal to the brake disks; and for a module the front end,
ombining the bumper, headlights, radiator and other smaller parts.
Many features of automotive prodution proesses have already been dis-
ussed in the literature. In partiular, the striking dierene between the
Japanese and the U.S. way of organizing upstream supply has been dis-
ussed in detail. Also the question of in- vs. outsouring has been subjet of
researh, as disussed, for instane, in the lassi example of General Motors
and Fisher Body.
2
Yet a large number of open questions remains related to positive and
normative aspets of organizing the upstream setor in the industry as a
paradigm example. Some of them are derived from the ase study evidene
in the sequel of the paper. They largely relate to the mode of upstream
innovation, and series supply prourement and ompensation shemes.
Our researh is geared by two interests. Firstly the methodologial one
introdued before. We wish to bring data loser to the theory and vie versa,
in the hope of mutual ross fertilization. In partiular, we attempt to show
where theory in its urrent state helps us interpreting what we observe. By
bringing data loser to theory, we also hope to lter out the pertinent models
from the overwhelmingly rih set of variants oered to date. Complementar-
ily, we hope to suggest aspets where additional theory is needed to explain
the empirial observations.
Seondly, we wish to ontribute speially to an understanding of the
players' ations in the automotive industry by analyzing and evaluating the
onsequenes of their ations, towards reommendations for a more eient
upstream interation, and industrial struture in this important setor.
The sequel of the paper evolves as follows. In setion 2.2 we outline our
ase study interview approah. In setion 2.3 we survey key ndings from
1
In the sequel we will only passim touh upon this interesting observation. The reasons
for this do merit further analysis.
2
See Klein, Crawford, and Alhian (1978) among others.
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in-depth ase interviews with senior management sales oials of upstream
suppliers and prourement oials of OEMs in Germany, and struture them
by miroeonomi priniples. In setion 2.4 we derive researh questions and
hypotheses, that upon further analysis are geared to answer these questions.
We summarize in the onluding setion 2.5.
2.2 Case study interviews: Approah
The fous of our ase study was on the inentive strutures involved in up-
stream prourement and their hange, primarily with respet to researh and
development, prodution planning and exeution, and also quality manage-
ment and logistis. All these dimensions an be addressed within formal
ontrats between the parties, as well as within informal arrangements.
Due to the omplexity as well as sensitivity of the issues addressed, we
hose an open, personal interview format. Interviews of on average about two
hours were onduted at the supplier level with senior management personnel
responsible for researh and development, prodution and sales; and at the
OEM level with management personnel responsible for parts prourement.
The interviews were organized around eight themati bloks, with a total of
some 70 general questions. These overed the produt disussed, its buyer
and supplier market, the ontrating proess for researh and development,
as well as series and spare part prodution, and nally the resulting after
sales market ativities.
3
The sequening of topis pursued in the interviews
was exible. The questions served to ontrol for ompleteness rather than
to presribe a strit shedule. The Appendix ontains questionnaire versions
for the upstream suppliers and the OEMs that mirror prourement from the
two player ategories' point of view. The questions disussing the same sub-
jet matter have the same number. The interviews were onduted between
November 2005 and May 2006.
Overall 45 upstream suppliers and 7 OEMs were approahed towards an
interview. The ompanies were olleted from the member list of the Verband
Deutsher Automobilunternehmen (VDA). All OEMs produing motorars
were onsidered. Upstream suppliers were seleted to generate a representa-
tive sample of the industry, where produt omplexity, ustomer speiity
and strength of market position are the key harateristis that dierentiate
suppliers. Interviews were onduted with 17 ompanies. Eah interview
of an upstream supplier foused on a representative produt range for that
3
After sales market ativities involve selling parts of vehiles that are no longer pro-
dued and sold anew, for whih the OEM extends an impliit guarantee that these parts
are made available for about 15 years after end of prodution.
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ompany. One of the suppliers was available for interviews in two divisions,
that are ating in eonomially as well as tehnially dierent markets.
In all, we onsider a total of 15 supplier and 3 OEM interviews in the
ensuing analysis. Of the OEMs interviewed, one is a high-volume vehile
produer and one is a pure premium vehile produer. The third oers a
mixed produt portfolio. Amongst the 15 suppliers, one was haraterized by
simple produts with a low ustomer speiity and a weak market position,
seven were haraterized by omplex produts with a low ustomer speiity
and a medium market share, six by omplex produts with a high ustomer
speiity and a medium market share and one by omplex produts with a
high ustomer speiity and a large market share.
4
Overall the interviewed ompanies had sales well in exess of EUR 100
billion, and employed more than 350.000 sta in 2004. The diversity of the
interviewed suppliers is also illustrated by their highly varying size, ranging
from sales of 200 million up until several billion Euros, and employment
gures between 2000 and well over 10.000. Average sales of all interviewed
ompanies were 6.8 billion and the median was at 1.9 billion Euros. The
average number of employees was 21.000, and the median number was 9.000.
Before we report on the results of our interview study, we should empha-
size that the interview results may be subjet to bias. Naturally we observe
only the rms surviving in the market. Firms unsuessful in the past are
likely to have exited. Sine the typial OEM is too big to fail, this self-
seletion bias is relatively more pronouned at the upstream supplier level.
In addition, of the ompanies still ative in the automotive industry, man-
agers of more suessful ompanies might be inlined to talk more openly
about their business, than managers of less suessful ones. Our intervie-
wees may also tend to overemphasize urrent business developments relative
to long-term hanges. For example, while we observe a long run inrease
in outsouring ativity, the interview partners emphasized the reent slight
bakswing. Many answers given in the interviews inlude very sensitive infor-
mation. In addition, supplier markets for ertain parts are thin, sometimes
with only two or three players in Europe or even world wide. Also the number
of OEMs worldwide is very limited. We have taken utmost are to anonymize
all statements.
4
The haraterization of suppliers was performed outside in via a luster analysis, based
on annual reports and auxiliary information available on their web sites.
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2.3 Prourement strutures in the automotive industry:
Evidene
2.3.1 Overview on interation strutures
As emphasized before, there are very few standardized ommodities involved
in the upstream prourement for automobile parts. Most parts, even O-
rings or srews in a vehile are produed speially for one vehile model,
in spei size, material, or mahining. Thus there are very few produts
taken o the shelves to be sold to dierent ar produers, or even to one ar
produer as arry-over parts, towards use in dierent models.
5
The various parts are highly omplementary in development, prodution
and delivery. The prodution proess is very sensitive to supply delays, as
most parts are no longer held in stok. Often the parts are haraterized
by very omplex interfaes to eah other, a feature that aets researh and
development, prodution, and part funtioning, inluding part failure and its
onsequenes. In onsequene the ativities of all parts suppliers are strongly
omplementary to eah other when onentrating on one ar model.
All of this alls for omplex models of vertial restraints, with several
ompeting prinipals (the OEMs) and multiple ompeting agents (the rst
tier upstream suppliers). Theoretial models on vertial restraints are for
example overed in the survey by Katz (1989). Note that externalities abound
in this struture. The ations of one party aet the prots of many, if not
all others, but the party typially takes its deision based only on the eets
of its own prots or utility.
The interation is ompliated by the fat that endogenous xed and
endogenous variable osts interat in a very intriate way. R&D eorts on-
stitute a major part of xed osts. When oneptualizing a vehile model, the
OEM typially thinks of so alled unique selling properties (USP) in whih
the model should provide innovative advantage over similar models oered
by ompeting OEMs.
6
Researh and development for a partiular part ould
in priniple be performed by the OEM, by his supplier, or by a joint eort.
However, the OEM typially diretly ontats partiularly innovative sup-
pliers, and adopts one of the gadgets developed by them, or initiates tenders
between a preseleted small group of potential suppliers, towards the develop-
ment of a onept for these innovative parts along the desired speiations.
5
In the automotive industry's jargon, all parts are alled ommodities that are similar
in all vehile models and produed without major R&D eort. This involves a large share
of parts but a small share of the total value proured.
6
These properties sometimes extend into the larger share of the OEM's portfolio of
models.
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If several suppliers partiipate, the onept ompetition phase for that part
ends with eah supplier submitting a proposal for the onstrution of that
part, inluding a prie quote for development and prodution.
Supplier eorts during this phase are most often not diretly ompensated
by the OEM. The supplier undertakes basi R&D eorts (about 10 per ent
of his total R&D outlay) at his own expense and risk, often in lose ontat
to universities and other researh failities, and presents the results to one or
several OEMs. In the ensuing pre-development phase the supplier engages,
sometimes in ooperation with a partiular OEM, in the development of
a prototype not geared towards a partiular vehile model, with the ost
again borne by the supplier or shared with the OEM. In most instanes, the
development of the model spei part is also onduted by the supplier, but
under the OEM's lose supervision. Sometimes this supervision is extended
into a joint development eort with the OEM.
Variable osts primarily arise per piee supplied. The OEM selets one
or possibly several suppliers to develop the part to prodution maturity.
Then often another tender is held, and the winner is awarded the series
prodution ontrat or portions thereof; for instane, the initial year of series
prodution. In most ases parts are proured from one supplier only at a time.
Dual souring, with the seond rm assigned a smaller share of prodution
volume, is rarely used amongst German OEMs. Finally, seond souring,
with a seond soure nominated, but no prodution share availed unless the
rst soure drops out, was not observed at all.
For many reasons inluding apaity utilization in development and pro-
dution as well as brand marketing, the typial OEM launhes individual
vehile models in dierent years. The observed pattern exhibits an overlap-
ping generations (OLG) struture. This is reeted in an OLG struture
of supply ontrats, often with the same supplier. When ontrating parts
for a new vehile model, the OEM frequently uses the oasion to renegoti-
ate prourement ontrats; in partiular pries, for parts built into running
models.
Shemes to reimburse the supplier's development eorts towards model
spei parts vary between overage of a xed share by the OEM, and ov-
erage by a mark up on prodution osts, rarely with a volume guarantee by
the OEM. Almost all prodution ontrats aount for learning ost savings
varying between 3 and 5 per ent p.a. The aforementioned renegotiations are
often geared towards the OEM's inreased partiipation in suh ost savings.
In the following subsetions we struture upstream-downstream intera-
tions, and our ase study evidene. This should help the development of
researh questions and hypotheses on upstream prourement behavior and
its eonomi eets pursued in the ensuing setion 2.4.
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2.3.2 Contratual inompleteness
Upstream supply ontrats in the industry exhibit a variety that ranges from
very spei, to general framework ontrats that outline a general under-
standing between the supplier and the OEM on the prourement of a part
during the life yle of a model. The shell for all ontrat forms is typially
provided by the OEM withinGeneral Terms and Conditions. A development,
or supply ontrat typially ontains the following speis: Contrat dura-
tion; dates and terms of supply; parts speiations and hanges of those;
quantity, logistis (order ow); quality and warranty management; payment
terms; anellation payments, and intelletual property rights on newly de-
veloped omponents.
There are very few, if any, ontrats that an be alled omplete.
7
Inom-
pleteness arises with respet to elements that are tehnially not veriable
(see below) or are too ostly to speify in a ontrat. They also do not over
all eventualities (possible states of nature). Court ases are rare and thus
veriability is rarely an issue, for an obvious reason: Most interations are
repeated, and thus it is not in the interest of at least one ontrating party
to draw the opposing party into ostly ourt rulings.
8
More speially, our ase study interviews suggest inompleteness pri-
marily in the following dimensions.
Attributes of the part are inherently speied inompletely at the moment
the development ontrat is written. Conversely the supplier's devel-
opment eort intensity is both not speied and not veriable.
Quantities proured by the OEM are speied typially via the OEMs' tar-
get vehile output quantities over the model's entire life time. Yet the
eetive quantities demanded are dependent on the nal demand for
the model. That is realized only in the short-run, and eetuated in
the OEM's release orders weeks or days before delivery. The ontrats
speify the release order proedure. The supplier determines his a-
paity largely at his own risk. The OEM very rarely grants volume
guarantees.
7
Interview results: Contrats used are widely inomplete and augmented with (partially
not veriable) side agreements (Yes=7, N/A=9, No=2), suh that the value of ontrats
for the relationship is limited.
8
Results from the interviews for the use of ourt proedures showed 6 `No', 12 `N/A'
and no `Yes'. Amongst the 6 `No', 2 suppliers expliitly stated they would not engage into
ourt proedures on patent infringements, 2 would not engage in proedures against the
OEM, if he dislosed researh results to ompetitor suppliers, 3 stated that they would
not engage in proedures against OEM in general (also general disregard of ontrats was
mentioned).
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Reliability is typially exerised within ontratual terms, in form of maxi-
mal failure rates (parts per million) required by the OEM, and so are
payment ows when responsibilities for failed parts are learly iden-
tiable. Contrats typially remain unlear with respet to failures
involving externalities disussed below, in the setion on reliability risk.
Pries at whih the part is delivered to the OEM are always preisely spei-
ed for the initial delivery period, e.g. one year. Framework ontrats,
however, inlude further delivery periods up to over the model lifetime.
If suh a ontrat is written, then pries for ensuing periods are either
pre-speied, with stepwise prie redution shedules to aount for
learning eets on the supplier side; or pries are renegotiated annu-
ally. In either ase, prie speiations are likely not to be binding.
The OEM may enfore renegotiations under breah of ontrat, whih
ontributes to ontratual inompleteness.
Swithing suppliers: While the disontinuation of a supply ontrat appears
to be a rare event, the onditions for a disontinuation apparently are
almost never ompletely speied. One of the few provisions from the
prourer's point of view is the property right over model spei tools
typially also naned by him. While in theory the tool an be trans-
ferred between suppliers, the swithing ost involved in the transfer is
very high, as stated by both OEMs and suppliers.
There are other omponents of the supplier-buyer-relationship that seem
to be not speied in ontrats at all. For example, there was no report
on provisions that aount for a supplier's potential nanial distress. In
view of the omplementarity between the parts, the OEM's interest in an
uninterrupted ow of supply, and the high swithing ost involved in hanging
a supplier, it is in the OEM's short run interest to bail-out a urrent supplier
in distress.
9
Also, the OEM may want to enhane ompetition between
suppliers of similar parts by resuing his present supplier. However, this
obviously distorts inentives at the supplier level. Alternatively, under dual
souring, the seond supplier may be asked by the OEM to also produe the
distressed supplier's share, towards a gain in reputation against the OEM.
10
9
Six suppliers stated expliitly that they observed situations in whih the OEM would
provide ex post bail-out for suppliers in distress. One supplier delined this. 11 suppliers
did not provide an answer.
10
We have found one instane in whih a ompetitor of the bankrupt supplier was asked
by the OEM to provide bailoutthus resuing the ompetitorin exhange for favorable
supply onditions on another ontrat.
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Further aspets resulting in ontratual inompleteness are borne out in the
sequel.
2.3.3 Complexity of parts exhanged
Led by inreasing demands on vehile features suh as engine power, en-
ergy eieny, ative and passive seurity, or operating noise redution, the
engineering omplexity of vehiles has inreased enormously in reent years.
This has given rise to the question of delegating development and prodution
of a part rather than produing it in-house. When prouring a part, prob-
lems arise from the delegation of ontrol over development and prodution
proesses. We have identied three omponents:
Development omplexity arises from the fat that the delegation of devel-
opment tasks may lead to loal rather than global optimization in the
development proess. This problem is more relevant for parts that are
essential for the funtionality of, and very muh integrated into the
struture of the vehile suh as the power train; rather than those that
are inessential but with funtions that ontribute to the vehile's over-
all quality, suh as the ar interior.
The main drivers of development omplexity are the essential part's
interfaes to other parts and the intensity of required development in-
terations. One attempt to ope with this omplexity problem is to
have the supplier's engineers take residene at the OEM's development
site. We have found this being ommon pratie during the develop-
ment phase of essential parts.
11
However, this only partially resolves
the problem, sine innovation in systems or modules may be driven
by suppliers further upstream. In ase of the development of a sys-
tem or module, the system or module supplier has to orhestrate these
development eorts.
Logistis omplexity is the omplexity inurred in the assembly of the system
or module, and the sheduling of the assembled parts supply in the
speiation that is in immediate demand. The logistis omplexity is
driven by the number of sub- suppliers involved and the omplexity of
the interfaes between the parts proured by the supplier. For essential
parts this interfae tends to be very omplex. Some of the sheduling
problems are aounted for by the establishment of Just-In-Time (JIT)
prodution failities by the supplier lose to the loation where the
vehile is assembled.
11
Out of our interviewees, resident engineer shemes are reported to be used by 7, no
interviewee rejeted the use of residene engineers, 11 did not respond in this respet.
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Contrat omplexity is the omplexity inurred by ontratual agreements
between the business partners, that arises from the outsouring of more
omplex parts. It ontains the ost of administering business ontats
with potential suppliers (inluding quality ertiation, et.) and the
atual ost of designing and exeuting the ontrat between the OEM
and atual suppliers (inluding the ost of quality ontrol, administra-
tion, lawyers, et.)
Overall the OEMs have reated to these dierent forms of omplexity by
the bundling of parts otherwise proured separately into systems or modules.
This should redue total omplexity problems between the OEM and the so-
alled rst-tier supplier. However, the redution of omplexity by inreased
prourement of systems and modules and systems at the level of the OEM
leads to longer supply hains, involving delegated monitoring.
We found two distint types of system or module suppliers: A rst type
proures and assembles all parts ontained in the system or module indepen-
dently of the OEM, and delivers it as one part to the OEM. While in this ase
the OEM enjoys minimum omplexity at least for logistis and ontrats, he
loses the diret ontat to the parts suppliers further upstream. The main
onsequene is a loss of ontrol over the development of the part.
A seond type only assembles all the parts, whih are proured by the
OEM. Whilst only the assembled part is shipped to the OEM suh that
the logistis omplexity for the OEM remains the same as with the rst
type system supplier, the OEM, by prouring himself, keeps ontat to parts
suppliers further upstream, at the expense of a higher ontrat omplexity.
Hybrids of the two models are ommon.
2.3.4 Risk and inomplete information
For eah part of a vehile in development, inomplete information of all
parties involved reates three major lasses of risk that need to be borne
by the OEM and its suppliers, namely innovation risk, volume risk, and
reliability risk. Portions of all risks are exogenous to the supply hierarhy.
For instane, volume risk is to some extent indued by random demand
shoks in the downstream ar market. However, there are also important
endogenous portions. For instane, volume risk is to some extent inuened
by the OEM's marketing eorts. In partiular, the reliability of the vehile
depends on the eort by many parties in the supply hain that goes into the
development (inluding testing) and the prodution of all the parts. In view
of this the risks need to be alloated between the partiipants of the supply
hain so as to reate eient eort inentives towards ontrolling these risks.
To be more spei, we onsider the following omponents:
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Innovation risk is the risk that either an innovation eort fails to ahieve
an ex-ante stated objetive, or the innovation is not ahieved at the
ex-ante expeted ost. Innovation risk diers between model unspe-
i basi researh and model spei adaptation development. Our
ase study evidene suggests that independent basi researh by the
supplier onstitutes only a small share (about 10 per ent) of his R&D
eort. However, the innovation risk involved in this remains fully with
him. The larger share of basi researh is ordered by the OEM, and
sometimes jointly pursued with him in a researh joint venture, whih
redues the supplier's risk. The remaining share of the supplier's R&D
eort onstitutes the model spei adaptation of innovation results.
While projet suess is almost sure, the remuneration of projet osts
is the major risk resting with the developing supplier, if the develop-
ment osts are reimbursed via a mark up on risky volume. Another
kind of innovation risk arises from the fat that nal onsumers' will-
ingness to pay for a partiular innovation embedded in a part may be
too low, relative to the ost of produing the innovative part. This risk
espeially arises when suppliers perform independent basi researh,
and post development, for the reason given, are faed with the problem
that OEMs are not willing to absorb the innovation.
Volume risk is the risk that the realized vehile sales volume is at variane
with the apaity determined on the basis of expeted volume. To the
upstream supplier the downside risk that volume is below expetations
and thus prodution apaity remains idle arries more nanial weight.
This risk is exogenous to some extent. However, the OEM's marketing
eorts are inuential. As ar parts are perfet omplements to eah
other, the risk arries over into the supply hain. Supply ontrats
almost never speify exat quantities. Even minimum quantities to be
absorbed by the OEM are rarely speied. However, if speied and the
atual numbers fall short of these, the OEM may agree to ompensation
payments that ap suppliers' risk.
12
Reliability risk is the risk that parts are subjet to a higher than expeted
failure rate. Additional omplexity in the risk involved is due to an
important externality. The failure of one part an indue the failure of
other parts. An extreme example is the failure of an O-ring that may
12
That OEMs guarantee minimum quantities is stated by 2 interviewees, 7 rejet the
use of minimum quantities. Out of the latter, 4 state the possibility of renegotiations
when quantities fall short of expetations, but with a strongly varying suess rate. 9
interviewees did not respond on this topi.
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destroy a ar's entire engine. The risk of individual part failure is to
a large extent endogenous and varies with the supplier's development
and prodution eort deision. The soure of reliability risk annot
always be identied. It is the OEM, however, who is exposed to the
quality risk vis à vis the nal onsumer, typially by a formal warranty
ommitment, and via reputational eets that may involve indiret
osts outweighing by orders of magnitude the diret osts of resolving
a warranty problem. Our ase study evidene suggests that in the
majority of ases failure an be attributed to the faulty part and the
supplier is billed the diret ost. Reputational risk, however, remains
with the OEM.
2.3.5 Asymmetri information
In upstream markets for buyer-spei parts suh as the one onsidered here,
informational asymmetries between OEMs and upstream suppliers take par-
tiular forms. By denition, the OEM should know best what suits his busi-
ness, beause that is determined by the nal onsumer's willingness to pay
for the entire vehile, omposed of many omplementary parts. By ontrast,
the supplier knows best the ost of developing and produing the good. More
speially,
R&D eort exerted by the supplier an only be inompletely monitored by
the prourer, whih invites moral hazard on the supplier side. Joint
development eorts, in partiular resident engineer shemes, redue
the informational asymmetry. Moral hazard is also ontained by the ex
post observability of the supplier's R&D suess embodied in a vehile
model, that may or may not invite repeated prourement from the same
supplier by the same OEM.
Cost information on development and prodution osts is a key private in-
formation of the supplier. During the initial prourement proess for a
new vehile model, the OEM an eliit ost information from the om-
peting suppliers; in the extreme form by asking them to reveal their
aounting numbers. Sine produts are idiosynrati, their produ-
tion is idiosynrati, so it requires a spei eort on the OEM's side
to uphold, or develop, skills towards evaluating ost strutures.
13
The ontinued prodution of parts is subjet to substantive learning
13
One OEM stated thatwhile fostering outsouringhe was losing this judging ability
due to the loss of tehnial expertise. Currently he is engaging in measures to stop this
drain of expertise.
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eets. Towards reduing informational asymmetries in ontinued pro-
urement phases, the OEMs generate ost estimates rst from the inter-
nal prodution of similar parts, as well as with the help of re-engineered
parts and a thorough ost analysis. When pries are renegotiated an-
nually under a framework ontrat, some OEMs organize inverse au-
tions, often by passing on onstrution blueprints to ompeting rms,
towards obtaining independent ost estimates. These are often used
to press on the inumbent supplier for ost redutions. Reently the
OEMs have aquired suient market power so that they an require
to an inreasing extent open book aounting, foring the supplier to
dislose his ost aounting sheme. This an only be protable for
the supplier if either he pursues "reative aounting" in order to hide
prots,
14
or if the OEM guarantees him an aeptable prot.
15
Cost monitoring by the OEM seems more onentrated on more valu-
able parts.
16
Also, the suppliers feel more squeezed when dealing with
a module supplier than with an OEM. Indeed, system and module sup-
pliers also may be fored to dislose their upstream ontratual rela-
tionships. The OEM may presribe the upstream partners and impose
a partiular ontratual relationship, via direted business.
Willingness to pay (WTP) by the OEM for a ertain proured part is de-
rived, in priniple, from the nal onsumers' willingness to pay for the
entire ar in the downstream market. Antiipating, and deomposing
that willingness to pay into the omponents supplied is one of the more
diult tasks in the design phase of a ar.
The OEM impliitly performs a hedoni prie deomposition,
17
and de-
rives his expeted benets by mirroring this with target ost aounting.
This ost aounting sheme serves to derive the OEM's WTP for the
part.
If a supplier has developed a novel gadget or feature on the basis of
his own R&D eorts, he an exploit monopoly power against the OEM
buyers. We found that when faed with the alternative to oer the
14
One supplier, who produes parts as well as the part spei tools, stated that the
ost aounting for the tools is muh less transparent than for the parts and that tools
show signiantly higher margins.
15
Apparently the open aounting sheme was adopted from Toyota, today onsidered
the world's most eient and protably vehile produer. However, Toyota seems to
guarantee an aeptable prot (or even prot sharing) in return, whilst this appears not
to be done by the German automotive produers.
16
Statement by one supplier: Best way to earn money is without attrating attention.
17
In all ases observed, this is done impliitly by asking the question of how muh more
the onsumer would be willing to pay for the ar if the gadget in question were inluded.
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gadget to one OEM towards its monopolisti exploitation in the nal
market, vs. to oer it more or less simultaneously to several OEMs, he
never prefers to oer it to one, but always to several OEMs - possibly
after the short term exploitation of monopoly under a short term (six
months to one year) exlusivity ontrat with one OEM. The rationales
given are twofold. Most gadgets are produed subjet to substantive
learning ost redutions, and due to limited enforeability of intelle-
tual property rights, ompeting suppliers ould ood the market with
lose (improved) produt variants.
Expeted prodution volume is an important prerequisite speiation for
the upstream supplier when determining his prodution apaity and
his unit ost; the latter espeially if both the xed development and the
xed prodution osts are naned via mark-ups on unit pries. The
OEM has an inentive to overstate the expeted prodution volume
when negotiating a new ontrat. Upstream exess apaity would
indue a more favorable ex post bargaining situation for him than a
apaity shortage, as the supplier's initially quoted per unit mark-ups
would be redued. By our observations, all suppliers antiipate this
and determine their apaity by disounting the numbers quoted by
the OEM by up to 30 perent.
Generally, by their own statements the players do not onsider very im-
portant informational asymmetries between rst tier suppliers and OEMs.
This should lead to relatively low information rents for all players. The
OEMs seem to be better informed about the suppliers than the suppliers
about OEMs. The OEMs learly engage atively in measures to redue the
suppliers' private information. Premium and volume OEMs assign diering
importane to the individual measures. Premium OEMs are more relutant
in the use of external measures to gain information suh as prourement au-
tions, in order to not urtail suppliers' innovation inentives. Instead, learn-
ing from past joint development ativities and from prourement with the
same supplier seems to be dominant. By ontrast, a volume OEM stressed
the importane of frequent pseudo-autions, as well as of re-engineering of
parts, as information gathering devies.
2.3.6 Mutual hold-up
Hold-up of the other party ould in priniple our in various ways. The
OEM faes hold-up risk by the supplier, as by delaying or disontinuing
delivery that supplier an bring the entire assembly proess to an expensive
halt. Additionally, during an ongoing development or prodution ontrat,
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the OEM faes the problem to inentivise the supplier towards exerting eort
on improving quality and/or reduing ost.
The supplier in turn faes the problem of potential leakage by the OEM
of the intelletual property inorporated into his produt, and the risk of
not being ordered the volume for whih he had designed apaity at a xed
ost. This problem is magnied when the supplier is not fully ompensated
upfront for his development and prodution xed osts. He then is unertain
about the ompensation of these xed osts in the fae of unertain quantities
delivered.
Although the OEM very often faes potential hold-up situations with his
suppliers we rarely see a supplier atually engaging in hold-up.
18
We found
it only in the rare situation in whih a supplier not originally under ontrat
for series prodution was asked to step in, beause the original supplier was
onfronted with quality problems. Conversely the hold up of suppliers by
OEMs seems to gure more prominently in two ontexts: Some OEMs tend
to pass on intelletual property to ompetitors, or tend to delay payments
for delivered parts.
While ontratual penalties ould remedy the problem, they seem not to
play a major role in supply ontrats. They also were never mentioned as a
strategi option.
2.3.7 Swithing ost and lok-in
The prodution of buyer-, and beyond those, of model-spei parts by a
supplier indues swithing osts to both the supplier and the OEM. More
speially, swithing ost may arise from the following soures:
Produt spei intelletual property rights often reside with the upstream
supplier. Often there is a generi onit of interest between the up-
stream supplier and the OEM. Whilst the OEM would like to exploit
suh rights by exlusively using the part in his model (or models), the
upstream supplier is interested in selling variants of suh a part to om-
peting OEMs. No matter the resolution of this onit, the property
right inreases the OEM's ost of swithing to another supplier of that
part. While sometimes the OEM exerts his market power to enfore
the liensing of the property right to the supplier's ompetitors, suh
an enforement is invariably related to a loss in the OEM's reputation
as a reliable trading partner.
18
A famous exeption is the hold up of Ford by Kiekert, a one time monopolist in the
prodution of ar loks, in Wahtler (2002).
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Prodution tools are the produt spei elements of a mahine to produe
a part. For example, the prodution of a body part neessitates a
welding press that an be used to press many dierent body parts, and
a tool that shapes the partiular body part. While the welding press
is owned by the supplier, the tool is owned by the OEM in all ases
we have observed, but only operated by the supplier. In priniple, this
enables OEM to withdraw the tool and to set it up with a ompeting
supplier.
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Yet the ost of reorganizing the supply stream appears so
high that this inident arises extremely rarely.
Proess know-how omplements the use of the tools to produe the ar part.
It is the apability to manage a partiular tehnology. In most ases
this knowledge is tehnially diult to transfer, and suh a transfer is
not enforeable. Together with the tools, the omplementing proess
know-how is idiosynrati and reates sizeable swithing ost to the
OEM.
Internal supplier ertiation on proess and produt quality as well as on
logistis proesses by the OEM is ostly. Indeed, internal supplier er-
tiation osts by the OEM exeed the external proess quality erti-
ation osts that are the prerequisite for a supplier to partiipate in
a tender at all. When swithing suppliers the OEM dupliates these
osts. The ase study evidene suggests that this is one of the main
elements onstituting swithing ost in a supply relationship.
Capaity that has been built up to supply the parts ordered for one vehile
model typially represents a substantive omponent of a supplier's total
order book. Within a Just-In-Time (JIT) manufaturing sheme the
apaity may have been built lose to the OEM's manufaturing outlet.
This apaity an not be easily reloated or adjusted to the prodution
of other parts, whih onstitutes the most important swithing ost to
the supplier.
Prodution downtime onneted with a swith of supplier is also a sizable
element of swithing ost. Even the transfer of one tool to another
supplier inits a sizeable loss on the prodution volume of a vehile,
if, as usual at urrent prodution logistis, the OEM does not hold a
buer stok of the part in question.
In all, sine the proured parts are omplementary to eah other, and de-
reasing ost tehnologies in development and prodution invite prourement
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It also allows the OEM to indiretly ontrol the markets for spare parts produed with
the tool.
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from one supplier only, that supplier has, largely due to the swithing osts
arising for the OEM, an ex post monopoly in the supply of any part that is
essential for the prodution of that vehile. However, the supplier also faes
high short run osts of swithing to another buyer.
Both, OEMs and suppliers an strategially inuene the level of swith-
ing osts. Within limits, the OEM an try to avoid produt idiosynrasies
and the assoiated jeopardy of being held-up. He an engage in industry-wide
standardization (e.g. halogen headlights, tires), but this is learly limited by
his interest in speifying unique selling propositions for his vehile models in
the market.
Keiretsu-like strutures as used by the Japanese OEM's an also resolve
the hold-up problem.
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The OEM may also employ dual souring as a safe-
guard against lok-in by the rst supplier. Yet this option must be weighed
against an inrease in overall prodution osts (i.e. double the xed ost and
thus lower eonomies of sale).
The typial supplier has fewer means to derease the swithing ost for
him. By ontrast, he an inrease the typial OEM's swithing osts by
inreasing the level of intelletual property embodied in the part supplied,
so that irumventing the innovation is ineient and ostly for the OEM.
Despite the high swithing ost and lok-in potential we rarely see hold-up
strategies being played.
2.3.8 Contratual interdependenies
In the automotive market, OEMs produe many models. The suppliers sup-
ply parts for many models of many OEMs. This inevitably leads to multi-
market-ontat between upstream suppliers and OEMs. From our ase study,
we observe that at any time supply ontrats are interdependent, mainly in
the following variants:
Supply ontrats for innovative and standard produts: Many upstream sup-
pliers provide both innovative omponents and standard ommodities
to the same OEM. We found evidene that suh an upstream supplier
appears limited in exploiting monopolisti advantage in the provision
of the innovative produt. This, he feels, would indue the OEM to
withdraw from the supply relationship for more ompetitive produts.
Supply ontrats for high and low volume produts: Contrats, so the sup-
pliers, dier by volume in their attrativeness to the typial supplier.
Large volume ontrats appear to be more protable to the typial
20
See MMillan (1990) for a desription of Keiretsu strutures.
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supplier than small volume ontrats - an indiret indiation for the
possibility that (portions of) information about dereasing osts re-
mains proprietary to the supplier.
OEMs also oer nihe models in small volumes, either beause they are
protable themselves, or beause there are positive branding spillovers.
At any rate, aording to our evidene, the OEM demands the supply
of small volumes for nihe produts when ontrating with the supplier
for large volume produts.
There is a third most important variant of ontratual interdependene
singled out below, namely an intertemporal ontratual interdependene.
Contratual interdependenies are virtually always indued by the OEM.
Only one premium OEM expliitly stated that he avoids bundling, while
fousing on the optimal ontrat for eah part.
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2.3.9 Repeated interations
A partiular form of ontratual interdependene arises when interations
between the same buyer and seller are repeated many times. Repetitions
may arise in the following form:
Repetition within a vehile model lifetime: There may be sequential on-
trats on the same vehile part. Two basi ontrat types have emerged.
One extends over one year, and an be (and in most ases is) extended
on an annual basis. The seond one, a framework ontrat, extends
over half or the entire model lifetime. However, pries are renegoti-
ated every year, with the option left to either party to disontinue the
ontrat without penalties.
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Repetition aross several vehile models: Owing to the OLG struture of
model supply, the OEM has to ontrat anew for struturally the same
parts when introduing a new model. The supplier of suh a part often
remains the same even when the part speiation has hanged. Our
evidene suggests that bargaining about parts supply for a new model is
frequentlyif not alwaysused towards renegotiating pries for parts
supplied for the prodution of an established model. The OEM often
onditions the award of a new ontrat to the supplier on an extra
prie redution on the old ontrat. In an exeptional ase the supplier
21
Result from the interviews: Bundling of ontrats is ommon pratie (Yes=13,
N/A=4, No=1).
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Conrmed in 12 interviews.
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would demand prie inreases on old ontrats in order to agree to a
new ontrat.
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2.4 Eets of prourement behavior on the automotive
industry: Researh questions and hypotheses
In this setion we speify researh questions derived from the evidene ob-
tained, hek them against existing theory, and develop hypotheses to be
analyzed further theoretially as well as empirially. We distinguish between
two types of hypotheses: those related to the eieny of ontrating be-
tween the partiipating (two) parties, and those related to the eieny of
the upstream industry struture that results from the observed ontrating
strutures. In all of this we take as given the OEMs' outsouring deision.
What is then primarily at stake is the interplay between market pressure
and prot inentives exerised on upstream rms to innovate and/or to redue
prodution osts. These fores exerise impat on magnitudes invariant in
the quantity produed (innovation eorts, xed prodution osts) and on
quantity dependent magnitudes (marginal prodution osts, that are in turn
dependent on xed osts).
2.4.1 Why does the typial OEM exerise dominant market power in the
design and exeution (enforement) of upstream ontratual
relationships?
One of the most intriguing observations we extrat from our ase study is
that in the relationship between OEMs and rst tier suppliers, the larger
market power rests with the OEMs, and this in spite of the fat that some
of the tier 1 rms are sizeable, and some of the supplier-industries' setors
(dened by produt range) at this level are muh more onentrated than
the automotive produing setor itself. A key example is the automotive
eletronis subsetor, with Bosh, the world's largest automotive supplier
and up to reently, Siemens VDO and now Conti being the leading rms.
Apparently, the automotive produers largely ditate the ontrats with the
tier 1 upstream suppliers.
This leads us to
Hypothesis 1: The OEM has larger relative market power beause he serves -
and thus is more knowledgeable about - the nal market. In partiular,
23
Result from the interviews: Conseutive ontrats are bundled in an OLG struture
ours (Yes=10, N/A=6, No=2).
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the inorporation of gadgets (developed and) provided by upstream
suppliers is up to the disretion of the OEM, whih gives him additional
market power.
2.4.2 Is upstream R&D eiently organized?
Eient (joint prot maximizing) R&D inentives require that the returns
to R&D are fully appropriated by the agent engaging in it.
R&D eorts are redued if
• they are not fully ompensated for
• their beneiary is not sure about their full value, whih indues moral
hazard on the seller side
• they at omplementarily and are onduted by independent agents,
sine omplementarity indues (unompensated) positive externalities
in inreased eort provision.
Hypothesis 2: Upstream innovative eorts are ineiently small sine they
are omplementary to eah other and produed by independent agents,
and even smaller
• if the OEM indues ompetition between innovators and does not
ompensate their ompetitive eorts
• if the OEM oers ompensation of innovative eort only within a
prodution ontrat to one of the innovators, and ompensation
is subjet to volume risk.
Hypothesis 3: Inentives to upstream suppliers to invest in both model un-
spei R&D and into model spei adaptation are eient only if
eort results are fully internalized, and in partiular ontratual provi-
sions are suh that the use of R&D results an be appropriately liensed
out.
A natural onit arises between the innovative upstream supplier and
the OEM with whom he has developed the rst appliation of the innovation.
While the latter has an inentive to monopolistially exploit the innovation,
the upstream supplier is interested in its multiple appliation, as multiple
appliations indue downstream ompetition and lead to a realloation of
rents to the upstream rm.
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Hypothesis 4: Overall eieny neessitates that R&D results are imple-
mented rst in premium models.
Buyers of premium models typially exerise relatively seletive tastes
for partiular vehile features, and thus exhibit a relatively prie inelasti
demand. This allows the innovator to reoup his R&D osts with higher
probability in a shorter time window, even in a regime where learning ost
eets annot be exploited (as yet).
In order to redue the omplexity of organizing the supply of all parts of a
vehile, the OEMs started in the 90ies of the last entury to proure the sup-
ply of so alled systems and modules. There are two types of system/module
suppliers: Systems onsist of multiple parts that are funtionally onneted,
modules of physially onneted parts. A typial example for a system is the
eletronis system. A typial example for a module is a ar front end. While
system suppliers tend to be highly innovative, module suppliers ompile and
assemble parts from other suppliers often without entral innovative features.
The latter suppliers thus onstitute just another level in the supply hierarhy.
The delegation of system/module development and prodution implies
delegation of responsibilities on
• monitoring innovation in omponents that form parts of the system/
module in question
• oordination of interfaes between the omponents
• monitoring the prodution osts of these omponents
• administering reliability problems, and absorbing warranty payments.
Hypothesis 5: The vertial ow of innovation is inhibited by the delegation
of module or system development and prodution.
Past work on supply networks, e.g. by Baron and Besanko (1984, 1992,
1994), shows that the existene of asymmetri information ould, espeially
in steeper hierarhies, lead to higher ost for the prourer ompared to atter
hierarhies. At best the ost of the organizational form stays onstant with
the inrease of a steeper hierarhy.
In the theoretial literature the protability of hierarhies is typially as-
sumed. Yet Baron and Besanko (1992, 1994, 1984); Mookherjee and Reihel-
stein (1997, 2001); Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004); Melumad, Mookherjee,
and Reihelstein (1995) look at the potential ost of hierarhies, whih is in
the fous of the above disussion on asymmetri information, lok-in, or loss
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of ontat to innovative suppliers in the prodution hain. Radner (1993);
Gruener and Shulte (2004a,b) over the optimal organization of hierarhies
under onstrained proessing power of the partiipating units, whih an also
be related to omplexity ost.
2.4.3 Are parts eiently pried?
By a standard argument, the pries of omplementary goods are too high
relatively to joint prot maximizing pries if determined independently, sine
omplementarity indues negative externalities from higher pries.
Hypothesis 6: At given levels of innovation, asymmetri information allows
upstream produers to set ineiently high parts pries, espeially if
upstream markets are onentrated and the OEM is inompletely in-
formed about upstream (innovation and) prodution osts.
2.4.4 Do ontratual interdependenes inrease the eieny of supply
ontrats?
In the world of rst-tier supply ontrats, ontratual interdependenes are
apparently generated and enfored by the OEMs. A primary driver appears
to be the OEM's interest to use his agenda setting power in substituting
for informational asymmetry. In the sequel, we onsider hypotheses under
the assumption that ontratual eieny is dened by the sum of surpluses
generated by the two bargaining parties.
Hypothesis 7: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between sup-
ply ontrats for innovative and standard parts is eieny dereasing.
Hypothesis 8: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between high
volume and low volume produts is eieny dereasing.
Hypothesis 9: The onstrution of ontratual interdependene between new
and running ontrats via prie renegotiation in urrent ontrats de-
reases long run eieny.
Contrats are inomplete and thus, by now standard arguments (Hart and
Moore, 1999; Grossman and Hart, 1986) annot fully disipline the partners
beause they give rise to ex post opportunism. Contratual solutions to ex-
post opportunism are treated e.g. by Che and Chung (1999), who nd that
the supplier hooses an eient investment level only if arrangements are
made suh that he an at least reoup the initial investment from later pay-
ments even after renegotiations. Repeated interations (eventually innitely
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often, or by Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) disontinuation
with low enough probability) an serve as a disiplining mehanism one
they involve trigger strategies by the players, thus balaning the inentives
for a partner to defet from the agreed ontrat by oering a high hane of
repetition one eah ontrat is honored, and disontinuation otherwise. See
also Blonski and Spagnolo (2002).
The upstream supplier's inentives to redue unit osts are dependent on
his ability to absorb the benets of his ost reduing eort. His preferene of
a high volume over a low volume ontrat suggests that the supply of high
volumes is more protable. This must imply that when designing the prie
deline lauses within a long term ontrat, the OEM annot fully antiipate
the ost redution eets due to learning.
If the ontinued engagement with the same supplier in both R&D and
in parts prourement would open hannels by whih information about ost
redution enjoyed by the supplier were revealed to the OEM as time goes by,
then it would be protable for the OEM, and possibly joint prot inreas-
ing, to renegotiate pries.
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It so far has not beome lear whether the prie
renegotiation frequently enfored by the OEMs is ever due to improved in-
formation, or more due to the short term opportunisti use of market power.
At any rate, intertemporal ontratual interdependenies inrease swithing
osts and, in onsequene lead to restrited entry into upstream market.
2.4.5 How do the players ope with mutual hold-up?
Here we assume that hold-up exerised by an agent is observable to the agent
subjet to.
Hypothesis 10: Hold-up by a supplier is washed out by ontratual interde-
pendene, and in partiular by repetition.
Hypothesis 11: Hold-up by the OEM via fored prie renegotiations is sus-
tainable by pure market power, but ineient even if suppliers ex ante
inorporate it in their alulus.
2.4.6 Does inreasing downstream ompetition redue upstream
innovation and produt reliability?
Downstream ompetition for any partiular vehile type (speied by size and
quality) an be thought of as taking plae in three major dimensions: Innova-
tiveness, reliability, and prie of the vehile. For any given R&D outlay, there
24
Meyer and Zwiebel (2006) treat this problem in a theoretial model.
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is a trade o between innovativeness and reliability: the more innovations
embedded in a new vehile model, the less these innovations an be exposed
to (expensive) test routines. Inreasing downstream ompetition leads to
inreasing pressure on the downstream sales prie for the vehile, as well as
to pressure on time-to-market, the time elapsing between the oneption of
a new model and its presentation in the market.
The Japanese automotive industry tends to produe ompetitively pried,
reliable vehiles with a lower level of innovation.
25
This allows in partiular
to use seond mover advantages by introduing innovations that are already
tested by other players in the market, whih also redues the time-to-market.
One possibility to dierentiate that is adopted by European vehile pro-
duers, is to introdue more innovative but, given the limitations on the
time-to-market indued by ompetitive pressure, less reliable vehiles. In
view of the pressure on returns and time-to-market, upstream suppliers are
simply left with the problem of produing at a given level of innovativeness
and a given time-to-market, less reliable parts.
Additional pressure in this diretion may be generated by suppliers' op-
portunism. Innovativeness signals an be protably exploited in the very
short run by the supplier within the upstream ompetitive ontext, and by
the OEM upon the introdution of a model, whilst reliability problems tend
to arise later in the model life yle, and are largely absorbed by the OEM.
Hypothesis 12: Inreasing downstream prie ompetition may lead to re-
dued produt reliability.
2.4.7 Are development, volume, and reliability risks alloated eiently?
Eonomi theory suggests that if a ertain risk is exogenous, it should be
alloated suh that the risk neutral party absorbs this risk. By ontrast, if a
risk is endogenous, the player able to inuene this risk aording to theory
should absorb the payos, suh that the inentives to manage the risk are
optimally set; see, for instane, Tirole (2003).
Let, in line with by now standard reasoning, the degree of risk aversion of
the rms in the value hain be diretly related to their size, with the OEM
as the biggest player being risk neutral.
From a theoretial point of view, the suppliers seem to be alloated an
ineiently high share of volume risk while on the other hand their share of
reliability risk seems to be below the eient level.
Hypothesis 13: If innovative eort primarily rests with the supplier, then
he should absorb the assoiated risk. If the OEM absorbs a share of
25
The only exeption to this general rule is the hybrid engine ar.
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it, then it should be made dependent on the supplier's degree of risk
aversion.
We observe that the OEMs take over a share of the xed prodution osts
of suppliers through naning the OEM spei tools. Yet the larger share
of the xed osts, espeially innovation adaptation osts and apaity osts
are typially not ompensated diretly but spread aross parts purhased by
the OEM. As the OEM rarely provides volume guarantees, this alloates a
share of volume risk to the supplier. The OEM typially overstates expeted
volumes during negotiations, that if used in the supplier's alulation would
derease his expeted average ost and make him lenient to a low prie oer.
However, suppliers antiipate this and typially alulate their oer pries
up to 30 perent deated volume estimates.
From a theoretial point of view, both the exogenous as well as the en-
dogenous proportion of demand unertainty suggest that it is eient to have
the OEM bear the assoiated volume risk.
Hypothesis 14: The OEM should bear a larger share of the volume risk than
the supplier.
As disussed above there exists a substantial reputation risk, from whih
the OEM suers most. This risk an not be transferred to the suppliers,
even if the size of the risk stays largely under the inuene of the suppliers,
for example if the suppliers' eort for quality of spei parts determines the
reliability of the whole ar.
Hypothesis 15: Reliability risks, inluding ollateral damage, should be al-
loated to the soure as far as possible. Reliability risks involving
unobservable soures should be pooled.
2.4.8 Is ost monitoring performed eiently?
In order to keep prodution ost down, the OEM might engage into moni-
toring ativities of all parts proured. Cost monitoring involves a large xed
ost omponent. Hene the OEM has an inentive to alloate more moni-
toring eort to the prodution of more valuable, rather than less valuable
parts. This inentivizes the supplier to ahieve higher ost savings and thus
higher margins with lower valued parts. In passing, this has impliations on
upstream suppliers' relative inentives to supply diretly to the OEM vs. to
supply to a module or system supplier. He prefers to supply to the former, as
the relative value of the same part supplied is the smaller, the more valuable
the end produt.
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Hypothesis 16: Independent of risk premia, supplier margins are inversely
related to the relative value of the part. This indues alloative ine-
ieny.
Suppliers fae the risk of bankrupty, whih is partly exogenous, e.g. due
to unexpeted rises in raw material pries. The alloation of this risk should
be orreted in view of the strit ex post omplementarities between the
upstream supply ows for urrent prodution, and in view of the fat that
while maintaining a more ompetitive upstream supply struture is helpful
for all OEMs, the individual OEM an internalize only part of this externality.
Exogeneity of the auses of nanial distress implies that gambling behavior
by the upstream supplier is not invited.
Hypothesis 17: OEMs should orhestrate eorts to bail out suppliers if dis-
tress is exogenously aused.
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2.4.9 Does OEM behavior indue an eient upstream industry struture?
In a purely prie driven ompetitive situation, an OEM should be interested
in more ompetition at eah level in the upstream value hain. This result
an be derived from standard aution theory or Cournot oligopoly theory
(f. e.g. Tirole, 2003; Krishna, 2003), where typially the revenue of one
side of the market inreases with the level of ompetition on the other side
of the market. In this respet the ase material apparently onrms the
theory. OEMs as well as suppliers stated that a very onentrated upstream
market does not allow for a full extration of prots from the suppliers. One
partiipant stated that two suppliers were not enough to eetively build up
prie pressure on the supply market.
However, revealed preferene suggests that it is at least in some OEMs'
interest to restrain ompetition. Espeially premium ar manufaturers en-
gage into the pratie of assigning ore suppliers, to whom they award most
of the ontats, thus hoping for a higher degree of innovation and reliability.
Yet one premium OEM stated expliitly that together with other OEMs he
subsidizes the entry of an additional supplier in a very onentrated market.
This strategy was also mentioned by several upstream suppliers. In all, it is
unlear whether the optimal level of upstream ompetition from the OEM's
point of view orresponds to an optimal level onerning industry inentives
for innovation and reliability.
Hypothesis 18: The assignment of ore suppliers by OEMs reates entry bar-
riers and thus an ineiently onentrated upstream market struture.
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One volume OEM expliitly suggested this strategy.
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2.5 Conluding remarks
Our ase study interviews foused on a broad range of phenomena in the
supply hain of the automotive industry we onsider worth further theoret-
ial investigation. We onsider interesting in partiular questions related to
naning innovation inluding alloative onsequenes and the alloation of
risks in the value hain.
Several aspets may also be worth a more detailed empirial analysis.
Among others, this onerns the pursuit of innovative ativities by suppliers,
initiated by or onneted to partiular OEMs. Why is there barely no ve-
hile model independent researh ativity of the suppliers? Also, is there a
relationship between part type and ontrat length? In partiular, are more
omplex parts supplied within longer term ontrats? And why does module
or system outsouring not emerge as predominant manufaturing organiza-
tion, given that it apparently leads to tighter ost ontrol?
A question not disussed here relates to the driving fores behind in-
reasing ompetition in the automotive industry that was assumed in the
speiation of our hypotheses. One lear sign is that automotive produers'
produt portfolios have beome muh more similar during the last ten years.
Unless the typial onsumer's hoie of brand dominates her hoie of ar
size and style, this move observed in the entire industry is bound to lead to
inreasing ompetition.
We found systemati exess apaity at the OEM level in need of ex-
planation, less so at the supplier level. Also, hanges in the tehnology of
produing automotive vehiles are all towards higher shares of xed to vari-
able osts. A typial example are ever inreasing shares of software in the
ar. This intensies questions as to appropriate linear or better, nonlinear
priing shemes.
On a broader sale, one might ask for the OEMs' role model in the au-
tomotive industry in the future, given reent and ongoing hanges in inno-
vation ativities, tehnology proliferation, and ompetition intensity. Whih
ativities remain in their generi ompetene, whih ones will, or should be
outsoured?
We hope that further work will be able to solve some of the open ques-
tions and thus further ontribute to bringing together eonomi theory and
empirial ndings in one of the major industries in the world.
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1.1.1. Was sind Ihre strategishen Ziele für den betrahteten Pro-
duktbereih für die Zukunft? (System- oder Teilelieferant,
Know-how Fokussierung)
1.1.2. Welhe Produkte (Systeme, Module oder Teile) werden von
Ihnen auÿerdem produziert bzw. eingekauft?
1.1.3. Ist hierbei Ihre Rolle als System- oder Teilelieferant von Be-
ginn an festgelegt oder entsheidet sih dies im Laufe der En-
twiklung? Wann entsheidet sih dies im letztern Fall typis-
herweise?
1.2. Wertshöpfung
1.2.1. Welhen Wertanteil hat das betrahtete Produkt an einem
Fahrzeug? Was sind die durhshnittlihen Einkaufskosten
und Verkaufspreise für dieses Produkt? Was ist die typishe
Umsatzmarge?
1.2.2. Welher Anteil der Wertshöpfung wird vom Systemlieferan-
ten, welher von dem (den) Teilelieferanten geshaen?
1.2.3. Inwieweit untersheiden sih Module/Systeme von Einzel-
teilen in Produktion und Einkauf hinsihtlih Lernkurven-
Eekten (Kosteneinsparung über Zeit; x Prozent pro Jahr)
und Eonomies of Sale (Kosteneinsparungen über gröÿere
Mengen; x Prozent bei doppelter Menge)?
1.3. Tehnologie und Innovation
1.3.1. Wie komplex ist das betrahtete Produkt? Kann es leiht
imitiert werden, weil alle Tehnologien zur Herstellung des
Produkts allgemein bekannt sind? Bestehen Patentrehte auf
Systeme, Module oder einzelne Teile?
1.3.2. Wie beurteilen Sie die tehnologishe Entwiklung der letzten
5 Jahre im Umfeld Ihres Produktes (insbesondere vor dem
Hintergrund einer stärkeren Fokussierung auf Fahrzeugelek-
tronik und Soft- gegenüber Hardware)?
1.3.3. Wie spezish für ein bestimmtes Fahrzeugmodell oder einen
OEM ist das Produkt in der Entwiklung und in der Produk-
tion?
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1.3.4. Wie komplex sind die Shnittstellen (Entwiklung und Ein-
bau) zum restlihen Fahrzeug (Umfang des Lastenhefts, In-
teraktion mit anderen Bauteilen/Systemen)?
1.3.5. Wie hoh sind die Innovationszyklen im betrahteten Pro-
dukt? Wie lange dauert es erfahrungsgemäÿ, bis eine Innova-
tion auf dem Markt ersheint?
1.3.6. Beshleunigt oder bremst die Vergabe von Modulen/Systemen
an Systemlieferanten die Zeit zwishen Entwiklung und
Markteinführung eines Fahrzeugs im Vergleih zur Eigenen-
twiklung durh den OEM?
2. Kunden
2.1.1. Mit welhen Unternehmen unterhalten Sie zu diesem Produkt
Lieferbeziehungen?
2.1.2. Welhe anderen Produkte liefern Sie auÿerdem an diese Un-
ternehmen? In wiefern wird die Lieferung vershiedener Pro-
dukte (z.B. über Baureihen) oder Projektbündel gemeinsam
verhandelt oder bestehen Rahmenverträge?
2.1.3. Welhe strategishen Implikationen ergeben sih aus Ihrer
Siht aus der Verbreiterung der Produktpalette durh
Fahrzeughersteller, z.B. durh die BMW 1er- und X-Serie,
den Porshe Cayenne oder die Meredes A-Klasse bzw. den
Maybah? Wie denken Sie wird dies von den Konsumenten
beurteilt?
2.1.4. Wie beurteilen Sie die Bedeutung der Produktein-
führungszeiten? Läÿt sih eine Tendenz zu kürzeren
Produkteinführungszeiten oder -lebenszyklen feststellen und
wie wirkt sih diese aus?
2.1.5. Hat sih aus Ihrer Siht der Wettbewerb zwishen den OEMs
erhöht? Was sind Ursahen hierfür (z.B. stagnierende Absatz-
zahlen, Überkapazitäten, et.)? Wie hat sih dies gegebenen-
falls auf Sie ausgewirkt?
3. Anbieter (im gleihen Produktmarkt)
3.1. Marktstruktur
3.1.1. Wie groÿ ist der Markt für das betrahtete Produkt in
Deutshland, Europa, weltweit (Umsatz, Stükzahlen)?
3.1.2. Wie viele Wettbewerber existieren für das betrahtete Pro-
dukt in Deutshland, in Europa, weltweit? In welher
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zeitlihen Reihenfolge erfolgte der Markteintritt Ihres Un-
ternehmens und der Ihrer Wettbewerber?
3.1.3. Wie verteilen sih die Marktanteile unter den angesprohenen
Wettbewerbern?
3.1.4. In welhem Umfang hängt die Anzahl der Stufen in der Liefer-
antenhierarhie ab von der Innovationsfrequenz im betra-
hteten Markt, der Komplexität des betrahteten Produkts,
der Volatilität der Nahfrage nah dem Produkt, dem Wet-
tbewerb im entsprehenden Produktmarkt oder im Fahrzeug-
markt allgemein?
3.2. Anbietereigenshaften
3.2.1. Gibt es tehnologishe Untershiede zwishen den Wettbewer-
bern?
3.2.2. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über Tehnologie und
Kostenstrukturen Ihrer Wettbewerber?
3.2.3. Was ist Ihre Eigentümerstruktur? Welhe Eigentümerstruk-
tur haben Ihre Wettbewerber, Zulieferer und Kunden?
3.2.4. In wieweit hat aus Ihrer Siht die Entwiklung und Stärkung
einer eigenen Zulieferer-Marke, z.B. durh Bosh, Einuss auf
den Wettbewerb unter Zulieferern?
3.3. Globalisierung
3.3.1. Welhen Einuÿ hat aus Ihrer Siht die Globalisierung der
Industrie (OEM und Zulieferer) auf den Wettbewerb?
3.3.2. In welher Form und weshalb verfolgen Sie heute und in
der Zukunft eine Globalisierungsstrategie (Zentrale Produk-
tion (High Teh vs. Low ost) und weltweiter Vertrieb vs.
Lokale/OEM-nahe Produktion und Vertrieb)?
3.3.3. In wieweit erfolgt eine Produktionsverlagerung gemeinsam
mit anderen System- oder Teilelieferanten oder OEMs? Wer
führt die Initiative an? In wieweit erfolgt eine (nanzielle)
Unterstützung durh andere Unternehmen, insb. den OEM?
3.3.4. In welhem Umfang führt eine Globalisierung der Produk-
tion zu einem verstärkten Wettbewerbsdruk auf Seiten der
System- oder Teilelieferanten, z.B. über Seond Souring?
4. Anbieterauswahl
4.1.1. Wie beurteilen Sie die Auslagerung der Herstellung von
ganzen Systemen oder Modulen vom Fahrzeughersteller zu
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sog. System- oder Modullieferanten und damit die Entwik-
lung von mehrstugen Zulieferhierarhien? Worin sehen Sie
Vor- und Nahteile einer solhen Entwiklung?
4.1.2. Was sind die wihtigsten Shritte in der Lieferantenauswahl
durh Ihre Kunden? Findet eine Auktion (Entwiklung und
Produktion) zwishen vershiedenen potentiellen Anbietern
statt und wenn ja zu welhem Zeitpunkt in der Lieferante-
nauswahl?
4.1.3. Wie viele (potentielle) Anbieter stehen dem OEM zu folgen-
den Zeitpunkten in der Lieferantenauswahl zur Verfügung:
in der Konzeptphase (vor Entwiklung, Entwiklungswettbe-
werb), während Entwiklung (Parallel Engineering), bei Auss-
hreibung der Produktion, während der Produktion (Seond
oder Dual Souring)? Wie verteilen sih Aufgaben und Volu-
mina bei mehreren Anbietern gleihzeitig?
4.1.4. Baut der OEM alternative Lieferanten (wenn niht shon bei
einer einzigen Modellreihe) über vershiedene Modellreihen
auf?
4.1.5. In wieweit gibt es Vorteile aus wiederholter Zusammenarbeit
über vershiedene Projekte hinweg zwishen OEM und Liefer-
anten? Wie werden diese bei der Vergabe neuer Projekte
berüksihtigt?
4.1.6. In welher Reihenfolge werden Verhandlungen geführt (und
ggf. Verträge geshlossen)? Zuerst zwishen OEM und den
Systemlieferanten oder zuerst zwishen Systemlieferanten und
indirekten Teilelieferanten?. Welhe Verträge werden zuletzt
geshlossen? Wer hat Ausstiegsmöglihkeiten, wann und zu
welhen Kosten? Wer bestimmt de Reihenfolge der Verhand-
lungen?
4.1.7. In welhem Umfang hat der OEM Einuÿ auf die Wahl der
indirekten Teilelieferanten durh die Systemlieferanten?
5. Entwiklung
5.1. Modellunspezishe Entwiklungen
5.1.1. Können Sie eine Vershiebung der Entwiklungsleistung vom
OEM zu System- oder Teilelieferanten feststellen? Wie
beurteilen Sie eine solhe Entwiklung, wo sehen Sie Vor- und
Nahteile?
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5.1.2. In wieweit shlieÿen sih Lieferanten untereinander oder mit
OEMs bzw. Systemlieferanten für über fahrzeugmodell-
spezishe Entwiklungsleistungen hinausgehende Forshung
zusammen?
5.1.3. Was sind die wihtigsten Vor- und Nahteile solher Kooper-
ationen?
5.1.4. Wie wirkt sih dies auf die Lieferantenauswahl und damit ggf.
auf Preise aus?
5.2. Modellspezishe Entwiklungen (Adaptionsentwiklungen)
5.2.1. Wie viel Entwiklungsaufwand (Zeit, Mann-Tage, EUR)
entsteht durh eine modellspezishe Anpassung (Entwik-
lung einer bereits prinzipiell bestehenden Tehnik in ein neues
Fahrzeugmodell)?
5.2.2. Welher Anteil am Entwiklungsaufwand wird vom Teileliefer-
anten, Systemlieferanten und dem OEM jeweils übernommen
(Wer entwikelt und wer trägt die anfallenden Kosten)?
5.2.3. Wer erhält typisherweise Patente an Entwiklungsleistun-
gen?
5.2.4. Wie werden die Aktivitäten der Beteiligten untereinander
koordiniert? Wer überwaht die Aktivitäten und deniert
Shnittstellen? Wer ist für den Erfolg verantwortlih?
5.2.5. Wie ndet bei Entwiklungen durh System- oder (direkten
oder indirekten) Teilelieferanten eine Koordination mit En-
twiklern anderer Bauteile statt?
5.2.6. In wieweit lassen sih Entwiklungserkenntnisse übertragen
und so eine Trennung von Entwiklung und Produktion er-
reihen? Welhen Anteil am gesamten Entwiklungsaufwand
(in Zeit, EUR) müsste bei einer Nah-Entwiklung neu aufge-
braht werden, wenn der Erstentwikler den Nahentwikler
mit allen vorhandenen Informationen unterstützt oder wenn
nur eine Übergabe von Zeihnungen und Prototypen erfolgt?
5.2.7. In wieweit kooperieren Sie auh mit direkten Wettbewer-
bern bei der Entwiklung von Bauteilen, z.B. um Gleihteilef-
fekte bei vershiedenen Fahrzeugen über Baureihen oder sogar
Marken hinweg zu nutzen?
5.2.8. Gibt es neben einer Entwiklung durh OEM oder Lieferanten
auh eine Entwiklung durh spezielle Entwiklungsrmen?
Wenn ja, wer nutzt solhe Firmen vor allem (OEM, System-
lieferant oder Teilelieferanten)? Was sind die Gründe für eine
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solhe Auslagerung von Entwiklungsleistung? Welher An-
teil an Entwiklungsleistungen wird dabei ausgelagert? Wie
verteilen sih dabei die Risiken, z.B. falls sih eine Entwik-
lung als fehlerhaft herausstellt?
6. Produktion
6.1. Produktionsentsheidungen
6.1.1. Auf welher Ebene der Zulieferhierarhie werden welhe
Entsheidungen getroen? (z.B. bezüglih Kapazitäten, Pro-
duktionsmengen und Losgröÿen)
6.1.2. Nutzt der Lieferant auh Produktionsmittel (Mashinen,
Werkzeuge oder auh Patente) des OEM bei der Produktion?
6.1.3. Rehnen die OEM mit (oder unternehmen die OEM etwas
gegen) drohende Insolvenzen der Systemlieferanten oder (di-
rekten und indirekten) Teilelieferanten? Wie hoh ist das jew-
eils zu erwartende Risiko?
6.2. Vertragsabweihungen und -strafen
6.2.1. Wie wollen Lieferanten und OEMs in Zukunft Qual-
itätssiherung betreiben, um kostspielige Rükrufaktionen zu
vermeiden, insb. vor dem Hintergrund einer Vershiebung
der Entwiklungsleistung vom OEM zu den System- oder
Teilelieferanten?
6.2.2. Wie und von wem werden Abweihungen von zuvor in
Verträgen spezizierten Kosten, Mengen oder Qualitäten fest-
gestellt? Wie sind entsprehende Strafen vertraglih aus-
gestaltet? Gibt es auÿervertraglihe Absprahen in dieser
Hinsiht?
6.2.3. Ist es möglih, Fehler im fertigen Produkt System- oder
Teilelieferanten zuzuweisen und gegebenenfalls entstehende
Zusatzkosten verursahungsgereht aufzuteilen? Ist es
möglih, Fehler des Systemlieferanten im Zusammenbau (im
Gegensatz zu den Fehlern der verbauten Einzelteile) des Sys-
tems/Moduls zu erkennen?
6.2.4. Wie häug sind im Nahhinein zu Tage tretende Missver-
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7.1.1. Was wird in den Verträgen typisherweise wann speziziert?
Werden Mengen bereits beim ersten Angebot festgelegt (ins-
besondere vor der letzten Möglihkeit der Parteien, aus dem
Vertrag ohne Vertragsstrafen auszusteigen)?
7.1.2. Wie lange ist die typishe Vertragsdauer und wer legt sie fest?
7.1.3. Gibt es selbst noh während der Vertragslaufzeit Nahver-
handlungen? Unter welhen Bedingungen nden Nahver-
handlungen statt und wer veranlasst diese?
7.1.4. In wieweit wird die Weitergabe von F&E Ergebnis-
sen der Zulieferer an Konkurrenten des OEM vertraglih
eingeshränkt?
7.1.5. Welhe Absprahen werden neben den vertraglihen Regelun-
gen zwishen OEM und Systemlieferanten bzw. zwishen
System- und indirekten Teilelieferanten typisherweise noh
getroen (niht justitiable Absprahen)?
7.2. Anreizstrukturen und Kostenteilung
7.2.1. In welher Form und Höhe sind Lieferverträge Performane-
abhängig (Zielerfüllung hinsihtlih Qualität und Menge)?
Gibt es Untershiede zwishen den vershiedenen Lieferan-
tenebenen?
7.2.2. In wieweit werden die Kosten für Investitionen des Lieferan-
ten vom OEM (bzw. bei indirekten Teilelieferanten vom Sys-
temlieferanten) übernommen, z.B. für Entwiklungen oder für
Mashinen und Werkzeuge?
7.2.3. Wie erfolgt in diesem Fall eine Übernahme der Kosten (direkte
Bezahlung, Umshlag auf eine festgelegte Produktionsmenge,
et.)?
7.2.4. Wie wirkt sih eine Kostenübernahme auf die Eigentum-
srehte, z.B. an Patenten oder Mashinen und Werkzeugen,
aus?
8. Informationen
8.1.1. Welhe Informationen hat ein Geshäftspartner (besonders
der OEM) über die Produktionskosten der anderen Part-
ner (System- und Teilelieferanten)? In wieweit geben Un-
tershiede zwishen alten und neuen Produktmodellen oder
Baureihen Anhaltspunkte hierfür?
8.1.2. Hat der Systemlieferant bessere Informationen über die
Kostenstruktur der indirekten Teilelieferanten als der OEM?
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8.1.3. Kann der OEM Informationen oder Vermutungen über die
Kosten des Systemlieferanten aus den Verhandlungen mit dem
indirekten Teilelieferanten ableiten (falls solhe stattnden)?
8.1.4. Wie exibel sind Ihre eigenen Informations- und Kostenreh-
nungssysteme, um vershiedene Vertragskonstellationen abzu-
bilden?
8.1.5. Sind die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten Teileliefer-
anten dem OEM bekannt? Wenn ja, welhe Elemente (z.B.
Preis, Menge, Qualität, Zusammenarbeit in der Forshung)?
Kann der OEM Verträge, die er selbst shlieÿt, daran
knüpfen?
8.1.6. Sind die Verträge zwishen dem OEM und Systemlieferan-
ten dem indirekten Teilelieferanten bekannt? Kann es z.B.
sein, dass der OEM direkt mit dem Teilelieferanten verhan-
delt und Daten aus dem Vertrag mit dem Systemlieferanten
weitergibt?




1.1.1. Was sind Ihre strategishen Ziele im Einkauf für die Zukunft?
(z.B. verstärktes Outsouring, Know-how Fokussierung, mehr
oder weniger Zusammenarbeit mit Systemlieferanten)
1.1.2. Welhe Produkte (Systeme, Module oder Teile) bzw. Pro-
duktgruppen werden von Ihnen von welhen Lieferanten
eingekauft? Wie ist Ihre Einkaufsorganisation aufgebaut?
(Weitere Details vgl. Kap. 3)
1.1.3. Ist hierbei der Einkauf von einem System- oder Teileliefer-
anten von Beginn an festgelegt oder entsheidet sih dies im
Laufe der Entwiklung? Wann entsheidet sih dies im let-
ztern Fall typisherweise?
1.2. Wertshöpfung
1.2.1. Welhen Wertanteil am Fahrzeug haben die eingekauften Pro-
dukte? Was ist der durhshnittlihe Materialkostenanteil,
Ihre Wertshöpfung und die Marge je Fahrzeug?
1.2.2. Welher Anteil der Wertshöpfung wird vom Systemlieferan-
ten, welher von dem (den) Teilelieferanten geshaen?
1.2.3. Erfahren Sie für Module/Systeme höhere oder niedrigere
Eonomies of Sale relativ zu Einzelbauteilen? In welher
Gröÿenordnung bewegen sih diese (Verdopplung der Einkauf-
menge führt zu x Prozent Einsparungen)? In wieweit beziehen
diese sih auf die Produktion (Lernkurveneekte) oder auf
Einkaufserfolge (Einkaufs-Eonomies of Sale)?
1.3. Tehnologie und Innovation
1.3.1. Wie komplex sind die betrahteten, von Ihnen eingekauften
Produkte (System, Modul oder Teil)? Sind alle Tehnologien
zur Herstellung dieser Produkte allgemein bekannt? Bestehen
Patentrehte auf Systeme, Module oder einzelne Teile?
1.3.2. Wie beurteilen Sie die tehnologishe Entwiklung der letzten
5 Jahre im Umfeld der von Ihnen eingekauften Produkte (ins-
besondere vor dem Hintergrund einer stärkeren Fokussierung
auf Fahrzeugelektronik und Soft- gegenüber Hardware)?
1.3.3. Wie spezish für ein bestimmtes Fahrzeugmodell oder einen
OEM sind die Produkte, in der Entwiklung und in der Pro-
duktion?
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1.3.4. Wie komplex sind die Shnittstellen (Entwiklung und Ein-
bau) zum restlihen Fahrzeug (Umfang des Lastenhefts, In-
teraktion mit anderen Bauteilen/Systemen)?
1.3.5. Wie lang sind die Innovationszyklen in den von Ihnen
eingekauften Produkten? Wie lange dauert es erfahrungs-
gemäÿ, bis eine Innovation auf dem Markt ersheint?
1.3.6. Beshleunigt oder bremst die Vergabe von Modulen/Systemen
an Systemlieferanten die Zeit zwishen Entwiklung und
Markteinführung eines Fahrzeugs im Vergleih zur Eigenen-
twiklung (durh den OEM)?
2. Kunden
2.1.1. Welhe anderen Unternehmen (OEM) werden vom selben
Lieferanten mit dem betrahteten oder einem vergleihbaren
Produkt beliefert? Welhe OEM kaufen bei anderen Liefer-
anten ein oder stellen das betrahtete Produkt selbst her?
2.1.2. Welhe anderen Produkte beziehen Sie noh vom selben
Lieferanten? In wiefern wird die Lieferung vershiedener Pro-
dukte (z.B. über Baureihen) oder Projektbündel gemeinsam
verhandelt oder bestehen Rahmenverträge?
2.1.3. Welhe strategishen Implikationen ergeben sih aus Ihrer
Siht aus der Verbreiterung der Produktpalette durh
Fahrzeughersteller, z.B. durh die BMW 1er- und X-Serie,
den Porshe Cayenne oder die Meredes A-Klasse bzw. den
Maybah? Wie denken Sie wird dies von den Konsumenten
beurteilt?
2.1.4. Wie beurteilen Sie die Bedeutung der Produktein-
führungszeiten? Läÿt sih eine Tendenz zu kürzeren
Produkteinführungszeiten oder -lebenszyklen feststellen und
wie wirkt sih diese aus?
2.1.5. Hat sih aus Ihrer Siht der Wettbewerb zwishen den OEMs
erhöht? Was sind Ursahen hierfür (z.B. stagnierende Absatz-
zahlen, Überkapazitäten, et.)? Wie hat sih dies gegebenen-
falls auf Sie ausgewirkt?
3. Anbieter (im gleihen Produktmarkt)
3.1. Marktstruktur
3.1.1. Wie groÿ ist der Markt für die von Ihnen eingekauften Pro-
dukte in Deutshland, Europa, weltweit: Wie viel Umsatz
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wird mit diesen Produkten p.a. erzielt? Wie viel Stük wer-
den umgesetzt?
3.1.2. Wie viele potentielle Lieferanten stehen Ihnen für die von Ih-
nen eingekauften Produkte zur Verfügung? Mit welhen un-
terhalten Sie Lieferbeziehungen?
3.1.3. Wie verteilen sih die Marktanteile unter den angesprohenen
Wettbewerbern?
3.1.4. In welhem Umfang hängt die Anzahl der Stufen in der Liefer-
antenhierarhie ab von der Innovationsfrequenz im betra-
hteten Markt, der Komplexität des betrahteten Produkts,
der Volatilität der Nahfrage nah dem Produkt, dem Wet-
tbewerb im entsprehenden Produktmarkt oder im Fahrzeug-
markt allgemein?
3.2. Anbietereigenshaften
3.2.1. Gibt es tehnologishe Untershiede zwishen den vershiede-
nen System - oder Teilelieferanten im Markt der von Ihnen
eingekauften Produkte?
3.2.2. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über Tehnologie und
Kostenstrukturen der Lieferanten?
3.2.3. Was ist die typishe Eigentümerstruktur eines System- und
eines Teilelieferanten: Welhe Eigentümer und Gesellshafts-
form existiert, in wieweit sind Tohterunternehmen und
Beteiligungen vorhanden?
3.2.4. In wieweit hat aus Ihrer Siht die Entwiklung und Stärkung
einer eigenen Zulieferer-Marke, z.B. durh Bosh, Einuss auf
den Wettbewerb unter Zulieferern? Wie beurteilen Sie als
OEM den Aufbau einer Zulieferer-Marke?
3.3. Globalisierung
3.3.1. Welhen Einuss hat aus Ihrer Siht die Globalisierung der
Industrie (sowohl der OEM als auh der Zulieferer) auf den
Wettbewerb?
3.3.2. In welher Form und weshalb verfolgen Sie heute und in der
Zukunft eine Globalisierungsstrategie (Zentrale Produktion
(High Teh vs. Low ost) und weltweiter Vertrieb vs. lokale
Produktion und Vertrieb)?
3.3.3. In wieweit erfolgt eine Produktionsverlagerung gemeinsam
mit System- oder Teilelieferanten oder OEMs? Wer führt die
Initiative an? In wieweit unterstützen Sie Ihre Lieferanten,
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z.B. nanziell? In wieweit unterstützen Lieferanten ihre Un-
terlieferanten bei einer Produktionsverlagerung?
3.3.4. In welhem Umfang führt eine Globalisierung der Produk-
tion zu einem verstärkten Wettbewerbsdruk auf Seiten der
System- oder Teilelieferanten, z.B. über Seond Souring?
4. Anbieterauswahl
4.1.1. Wie beurteilen Sie die Auslagerung der Herstellung von
ganzen Systemen oder Modulen zu sog. System- oder Mod-
ullieferanten und damit die Entwiklung von mehrstugen
Zulieferhierarhien? Worin sehen Sie Vor- und Nahteile einer
solhen Entwiklung?
4.1.2. Was sind die wihtigsten Shritte in der Lieferantenauswahl?
Findet eine Auktion (Entwiklung und Produktion) zwishen
vershiedenen potentiellen Anbietern statt und wenn ja zu
welhem Zeitpunkt in der Lieferantenauswahl?
4.1.3. Wie viele potentielle Geshäftspartner im Systemlieferanten-
und (direkten oder indirekten) Teilelieferantenlevel stehen Ih-
nen typisherweise während der folgenden Phasen zur Ver-
fügung: in der Konzeptphase (vor Entwiklung, Entwik-
lungswettbewerb), während Entwiklung (Parallel Engineer-
ing), bei Ausshreibung der Produktion, während der Pro-
duktion (Seond oder Dual Souring)? Wie verteilen sih
Aufgaben und Volumina bei mehreren Anbietern gleihzeitig?
4.1.4. Bauen Sie alternative Lieferanten (wenn niht shon bei einer
einzigen Modellreihe) über vershiedene Modellreihen auf?
4.1.5. In wieweit gibt es Vorteile aus wiederholter Zusammenarbeit
mit einem bestimmten Lieferanten über vershiedene Projekte
hinweg? Wie werden diese bei der Vergabe neuer Projekte
berüksihtigt?
4.1.6. In welher Reihenfolge werden Verhandlungen geführt (und
ggf. Verträge geshlossen)? Zuerst zwishen Ihnen und den
Systemlieferanten oder zuerst zwishen Systemlieferanten und
indirekten Teilelieferanten? Welhe Verträge werden zuletzt
geshlossen? Wer hat Ausstiegsmöglihkeiten, wann und zu
welhen Kosten? Wer bestimmt de Reihenfolge der Verhand-
lungen?
4.1.7. In welhem Umfang haben Sie Einuÿ auf die Wahl der in-
direkten Teilelieferanten durh einen Systemlieferanten (sog.
Direted Business)?
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5. Entwiklung
5.1. Modellunspezishe Entwiklungen
5.1.1. Können Sie eine Vershiebung der Entwiklungsleistung (vom
OEM) zu System- oder Teilelieferanten feststellen? Wie
beurteilen Sie eine solhe Entwiklung, wo sehen Sie Vor- und
Nahteile?
5.1.2. In wieweit shlieÿen sih Lieferanten untereinander oder
mit Systemlieferanten oder Ihnen als OEM für über
fahrzeugmodellspezishe Entwiklungsleistungen hinausge-
hende Forshung zusammen?
5.1.3. Was sind die wihtigsten Vor- und Nahteile solher Kooper-
ationen?
5.1.4. Wie wirkt sih dies auf die Lieferantenauswahl und damit ggf.
auf Preise aus?
5.2. Modellspezishe Entwiklungen (Adaptionsentwiklungen)
5.2.1. Wie viel Entwiklungsaufwand (Zeit, Mann-Tage, EUR) fällt
für ein neues Fahrzeugmodell insgesamt an? Wie teilt sih
dieser Aufwand zwishen Grundlagen- und Adaptionsentwik-
lungen auf? Wie verhält sih dies für einzelne exemplarishe
(eingekaufte) Teile?
5.2.2. Welher Anteil am Entwiklungsaufwand wird vom Teileliefer-
anten, Systemlieferanten und Ihnen als OEM jeweils über-
nommen (Wer entwikelt und wer trägt die anfallenden
Kosten)?
5.2.3. Wer erhält typisherweise Patente an Entwiklungsleistun-
gen?
5.2.4. Wie werden die Aktivitäten der Beteiligten untereinander
koordiniert? Wer überwaht die Aktivitäten und deniert
Shnittstellen? Wer ist für den Erfolg verantwortlih?
5.2.5. Wie ndet bei Entwiklungen durh System- oder (direkten
oder indirekten) Teilelieferanten eine Koordination mit En-
twiklern anderer Bauteile statt?
5.2.6. In wieweit lassen sih Entwiklungserkenntnisse übertragen
und so eine Trennung von Entwiklung und Produktion er-
reihen? Welhen Anteil am gesamten Entwiklungsaufwand
(in Zeit, EUR) müsste bei einer Nah-Entwiklung neu aufge-
braht werden wenn der Erstentwikler den Nahentwikler
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mit allen vorhandenen Informationen unterstützt oder wenn
nur eine Übergabe von Zeihnungen und Prototypen erfolgt?
5.2.7. In wieweit kooperieren Sie auh mit Wettbewerbern oder
Lieferanten von Wettbewerbern bei der Entwiklung von
Bauteilen, z.B. um Gleihteileekte bei vershiedenen
Fahrzeugen über Baureihen oder sogar Marken hinweg zu
nutzen?
5.2.8. Gibt es neben einer Entwiklung durh OEM oder Lieferanten
auh eine Entwiklung durh spezielle Entwiklungsrmen?
Wenn ja, wer nutzt solhe Firmen vor Allem (OEM, System-
lieferant oder Teilelieferanten)? Was sind die Gründe für eine
solhe Auslagerung von Entwiklungsleistung? Welher An-
teil an Entwiklungsleistungen wird dabei ausgelagert? Wie
verteilen sih dabei die Risiken, z.B. falls sih eine Entwik-
lung als fehlerhaft herausstellt?
6. Produktion
6.1. Produktionsentsheidungen
6.1.1. Auf welher Ebene (OEM, Systemlieferant, Teilelieferant)
werden welhe Entsheidungen getroen? (z.B. bezüglih Ka-
pazitäten, Produktionsmengen und Losgröÿen)
6.1.2. Nutzen Lieferanten auh Ihre Produktionsmittel (Mashinen,
Werkzeuge oder auh Patente) oder die von Systemlieferan-
ten?
6.1.3. Rehnen Sie mit (oder unternehmen Sie etwas gegen) dro-
hende Insolvenzen der Systemlieferanten oder (direkten und
indirekten) Teilelieferanten? Wie hoh ist das jeweils zu er-
wartende Risiko?
6.2. Vertragsabweihungen und -strafen
6.2.1. Wie wollen Sie und Ihre Lieferanten in Zukunft Qual-
itätssiherung betreiben, um kostspielige Rükrufaktionen zu
vermeiden, insb. vor dem Hintergrund einer Vershiebung
der Entwiklungsleistung vom OEM zu den System- oder
Teilelieferanten?
6.2.2. Wie und von wem werden Abweihungen von zuvor in
Verträgen spezizierten Kosten, Mengen oder Qualitäten fest-
gestellt? Wie sind entsprehende Strafen vertraglih aus-
gestaltet? Gibt es auÿervertraglihe Absprahen in dieser
Hinsiht?
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6.2.3. Ist es möglih, Fehler im fertigen Produkt System- oder
Teilelieferanten zuzuweisen und gegebenenfalls entstehende
Zusatzkosten verursahungsgereht aufzuteilen? Ist es
möglih, Fehler des Systemlieferanten im Zusammenbau (im
Gegensatz zu den Fehlern der verbauten Einzelteile) des Sys-
tems/Moduls zu erkennen?
6.2.4. Wie häug sind im Nahhinein zu Tage tretende Missver-




7.1.1. Was wird in den Verträgen typisherweise wann speziziert?
Werden Mengen bereits beim ersten Angebot festgelegt (ins-
besondere vor der letzten Möglihkeit der Parteien, aus dem
Vertrag ohne Vertragsstrafen auszusteigen)?
7.1.2. Wie lange ist die typishe Vertragsdauer und wer legt sie fest?
7.1.3. Gibt es selbst noh während der Vertragslaufzeit Nahver-
handlungen? Unter welhen Bedingungen nden Nahver-
handlungen statt und wer veranlasst diese?
7.1.4. In wieweit wird die Weitergabe von F&E Ergebnissen der
System- oder Teilelieferanten an andere OEM vertraglih
eingeshränkt?
7.1.5. Welhe Absprahen werden neben den vertraglihen Regelun-
gen zwishen Ihnen und Systemlieferanten bzw. zwishen
System- und indirekten Teilelieferanten typisherweise noh
getroen (niht justitiable Absprahen)?
7.2. Anreizstrukturen und Kostenteilung
7.2.1. Hängen die Gewinne der Firmen, die direkt an Sie liefern,
stärker von ihrer Performane (Zielerfüllung hinsihtlih
Qualität und Menge) ab? Beinhalten z.B. die Verträge zwis-
hen Ihnen und Systemlieferanten einen höheren paushalen
Anteil und die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten
Teilelieferanten einen höheren produktionsmengenabhängigen
Anteil?
7.2.2. In wieweit werden die Kosten für Investitionen der Sys-
temlieferanten oder Teilelieferanten von Ihnen übernom-
men, z.B. für Entwiklungen oder für Mashinen und
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Werkzeuge? Übernehmen Systemlieferanten solhe Kosten
bei den Teilelieferanten?
7.2.3. Wie erfolgt in diesem Fall eine Übernahme der Kosten (direkte
Bezahlung, Umshlag auf eine festgelegte Produktionsmenge,
et.)?
7.2.4. Wie wirkt sih eine Kostenübernahme auf die Eigentum-
srehte, z.B. an Patenten oder Mashinen und Werkzeugen,
aus?
8. Informationen
8.1.1. Welhe Informationen haben Sie über die Produktionskosten
und Gewinne Ihrer Geshäftspartner (System- und indirek-
ten Teilelieferanten)? In wieweit geben Untershiede zwis-
hen alten und neuen Produktmodellen oder Baureihen An-
haltspunkte hierfür?
8.1.2. Hat der Systemlieferant bessere Informationen über die
Kostenstruktur der indirekten Teilelieferanten als Sie?
8.1.3. Können Sie Informationen/Vermutungen über die Kosten des
Systemlieferanten aus den Verhandlungen mit dem indirekten
Teilelieferanten ableiten (falls solhe stattnden)?
8.1.4. Werden von System- oder Teilelieferanten Preismenüs (z.B.
vershiedene Möglihkeiten der Kompensation von Entwik-
lungskosten) angeboten? Wie transparent sind diese Kalku-
lationen?
8.1.5. Sind Ihnen die Verträge zwishen System- und indirekten
Teilelieferanten bekannt? Wenn ja, welhe Elemente (z.B.
Preis, Menge, Qualität, Zusammenarbeit in der Forshung)?
Können Sie Verträge, die Sie selbst shlieÿen, daran knüpfen?
8.1.6. Sind die Verträge zwishen Ihnen und dem Systemlieferanten
den indirekten Teilelieferanten bekannt? Kann es z.B. sein,
dass Sie direkt mit dem Teilelieferanten verhandeln und Daten
aus dem Vertrag mit dem Systemlieferanten weitergeben?
3. DELEGATION AND HIERARCHIES IN AUTOMOTIVE




In reent years prourement of automotive manufaturers, heneforth OEMs,
has hanged with fewer suppliers developing and produing a wider range
of vehile parts. This has, among others, given rise to so-alled module
or system suppliers who ombine vehile parts either spatially (modules) or
funtionally (systems). Thus both assembly, as mainly in the ase of modules,
as well as researh and development, notably when tehnially advaned and
innovative systems are onerned, are outsoured from the OEM to suppliers.
On rst sight, this strategy may have redued prourement omplexity as
OEMs an proure bigger pakages from fewer suppliers. But it also ontains
a greater loss of ontrol of the value reating proess. When prouring a
pakage of several parts together, the OEM loses information and ontrol of
these individual parts, espeially if they are originally produed by dierent
suppliers. To regain ontrol of the supply hain, automotive OEMs have been
inreasingly ative in the management of sub-suppliers, often referred to as
direted business in the industry. Direted business implies that the prourer
diretly negotiates with sub-suppliers of his diret or tier 1 supplier, onludes
supply ontrats and presribes the sub-suppliers to the tier 1 supplier. Yet
the management of the development and later prodution proess remains
with the tier 1 supplier.
Direted business is a relatively reent phenomenon and has reeived lit-
tle attention both in business management and in the eonomi literature.
Nevertheless it is an important strategy in the automotive industry. One of
the few works on direted business, Girshik (2002), states that in the ase of
bumper modules, 70 Perent of all parts are proured via direted business
1
.
In addition, Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) onduted interviews with
senior managers in the automotive industry and disussed, among others, the
eient organization of the supply hain.
Direted business in the automotive industry provides an exellent op-
portunity to test the theory of delegation and hierarhies. Centralization in
its strit empirial interpretation refers to the prourement of all individual
parts of the OEM himself. This would also entail the management of the
development and prodution proess inluding assembly. Delegation refers
to delegation of researh and development, prodution and also sub-supplier
negotiations to a tier 1 supplier. Thus omparing entralization with delega-
tion may be largely driven by dierenes in assembly osts or eonomies of
sale in prodution or researh and development. On the other hand, direted
business represents an intermediary ase where sub-supplier negotiations are
1
See page 4 in Girshik (2002).
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entralized, but all other aspets remain delegated. Thus the deision to
engage in direted business will be solely driven by problems in asymmetri
information and moral hazard as they are disussed in the literature on dele-
gation and hierarhies as e.g. in Baron and Besanko (1992), Mookherjee and
Tsumagari (2004), Baliga and Sjöström (1998) or Radner (1993). The pivotal
goal of this artile is thus to test, based on existing theoretial researh, the
hypotheses on the OEM's deision whether to engage in direted business or
to allow the tier 1 supplier to independently soure its upstream produts.
Poliy impliations for automotive OEMs an then be derived.
We nd that direted business, or entralization of ontrating, leads to
more ost transpareny and more frequent renegotiations with the tier 1
supplier. This indiates a derease of informational rents of the supplier as
predited by theory. In addition, we show that direted business inludes
higher development eort by the OEM and (weakly) redues inentives of
the tier 1 supplier to produe suient quality. Surprisingly, no signiant
dierene between premium and volume OEMs regarding direted business
is found, whih may indiate that in prourement OEMs do not dierentiate
themselves as muh as theory would suggest.
The artile is organized as follows. Setion 3.2 presents the existing lit-
erature on delegation and hierarhies as well as existing empirial ndings
regarding the automotive industry in this respet. In Setion 3.3 we desribe
the data set analyzed and afterwards derive hypothesis for direted business
in Setion 3.4, based on theoretial preditions. Setion 3.5 presents the
empirial evidene and Setion 3.6 onludes.
3.2 Literature
Several strands of theory ould be relevant to explain the phenomenon of
direted business in the automotive industry. Most losely related is the lit-
erature on hierarhies and delegation, whih applies both to problems within
a rm or to prourement, as e.g. Mookherjee (2006) points out. This litera-
ture an be divided into two main areas. One strand fouses on information
asymmetries or moral hazard but assumes no transation and information
proessing osts. The seond strand of literature ignores the latter and ex-
pliitly analyzes ostly information proessing. Direted business may also
be interpreted from the perspetive of the theory of the rm and the question
of in- vs. outsouring of ativities. The property rights theory as developed
by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) with its empirial
impliations espeially to the automotive industry has been widely disussed,
e.g. in Klein (1988). Its appliation to the ase of direted business is less
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obvious, beause all property rights stay with the same party, the tier 1 or
the sub-supplier, irrespetive of independent souring or direted business.
2
Thus we will not onentrate on this strand of literature.
3.2.1 Hierarhies and asymmetri information
A large number of artiles analyzes hierarhies in a setting with a prinipal
and two produtive agents where the agents have private information about
their osts.
3
Centralization in this ontext refers to the prinipal diretly
ontrating with both agents, while under delegation he ontrats with one
agent only and this agent onludes a ontrat with the seond agent. Del-
egation then refers to independent souring in the automotive industry and
direted business orresponds to entralization.
The key results of this literature, as e.g. Baron and Besanko (1992),
Gilbert and Riordan (1995) or Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1995),
is that entralization is at least as good as delegation beause the latter may
indue a double marginalization of rents and thus prodution misalloation
and ineienies. The disadvantages of delegation may nevertheless be elim-
inated under observability of sub-ontrating osts or prodution alloation
by the prinipal, top down ontrating and risk neutrality and no limited
liability of agents.
4
Collusion among agents and the existene of a third, better informed
agent, the middleman, may hange the results obtained. Introduing an in-
formed middleman should intuitively make delegation more attrative. Yet
the prinipal ould always extrat the middleman's information through di-
ret entralized ontrating with all parties, thus avoiding the disadvantages
of delegation. If the middleman and the agents an ollude, this prevents




Nevertheless, if one takes outsouring by the automotive OEM as given, one may argue
that the more spei investments are, the more will both parties, the prouring OEM and
the supplier, prefer to ontrat with eah other diretly and not through a middleman,
i.e. the tier 1 supplier. However, this hierarhial issue is not speially addressed in the
property rights theory.
3
The artile by Mookherjee (2006) provides an extensive survey of the reent theoretial
literature on this area of researh.
4
Note that the authors in all these artiles also assume that there are no osts of
ommuniation, ontrating or information proessing.
5
On the other hand, ollusion will be harder to enfore under entralization, beause
agents will always be able to opt out of the ollusive agreement and diretly ontrat
with the prinipal. With ollusion, enforeability is a main onern and most literature
assumes either long-term ontrats or restrits to self-enforing behavior. Furthermore, it
is assumed that agents an realloate payment and prodution between themselves without
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Two artiles disuss a setting with one produtive agent and one mid-
dleman where the prodution osts of the agent are private information. In
Faure-Grimaud, Laont, and David (2003), the authors nd that delegation
is equivalent to entralization. The key driver of this result is that ollusion
among agents also under entralization leads to the same distortions as dele-
gation.
6
Also the artile nds that it is welfare maximizing if the middleman
does not have full but only some information about agents.
7
In Celik (2007),
delegation is dominated by entralization beause the middleman distorts
the alloation of prodution. In some ases, it is even better to not involve
the informed middleman at all. The informational asymmetries though are
limited as there an only be three dierent ost levels for the agent, out of
whih one is always known by the middleman.
8
The artile by Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) analyzes deentraliza-
tion versus entralization in a setting with two agents, with or without an in-
formed middleman. Without an informed middleman, entralization always
dominates deentralization beause of a double marginalization of rents.
9
With an informed middleman, deentralization dominates, assumed that the
double marginalization of rents through delegation is small enough.
10
This
result holds also given ollusion between the agents and the middleman. The
benets of delegation rely on the superior information of the middleman
11
,
the intuition being that the prourer will prefer to ontrat with a more "in-
ternally eient" oalition. While Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) only
onsider the two polar ases where the middleman has either perfet infor-
mation or the same information as the prourer, they hypothesize that the
value of delegation monotonially inreases in the middleman's degree of in-
formation relative to the prourer.
The work of Laont and Martimort (1998) is losely related to Mookher-
jee and Tsumagari (2004) but inludes limits on ommuniation. The agents
then an not reveal all information to the prinipal in the entralized meh-
anism, whih renders delegation superior.
12
the prinipal's knowledge. Whether this holds in the automotive industry is questionable.
6
The question whether and how ollusive agreements between agents an be enfored
drives the results, obviously.
7
Thus the degree of information is interior, in the sense that it is larger than zero but




This result holds irrespetive of ollusion among the agents.
10




Note also that in Laont and Martimort (1998), it is assumed that the tier 1 supplier
has all bargaining power under delegation while under entralization a third party designs
the side ontrat for the agents.
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3.2.2 Hierarhies and moral hazard
The artile by Baliga and Sjöström (1998) disusses moral hazard and dele-
gation in a setting with one prinipal and two agents who provide eort that
jointly determines the probability of suess of the projet. The agents are
also limited liable and an ollude. The prinipal an either diretly ontrat
with two agents or ontrat with agent two only, who then ontrats with
agent one. Neither eort is ex post observed by the prourer, only the suess
of the projet. But agent two observes the eort of agent one before deiding
his own eort level. The authors then nd that delegation dominates entral-
ization. Only when ollusion is not fully possible
13
, entralization is superior.
The intuition for the superiority of delegation may be interpreted in parallel
to the adverse seletion literature as in Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004).
Given ollusion among agents and omplementarities, it is superior to dele-
gate to a better informed middleman, where in Mookherjee and Tsumagari
(2004) the middleman has better information about the osts of the agent
and in Baliga and Sjöström (1998) agent two observes the eort level of agent
one.
Another artile on delegation and moral hazard is Maho-Stadler and
Pérez-Castrillo (1998). As in Baliga and Sjöström (1998), two agents' eort
determines the outome of a projet and the prinipal an either delegate to
one agent or ontrat entrally. The authors apply their theoretial work to
franhising. The result is similar. If ollusion an not be avoided
14
, delegation
is superior. This result also depends on ontrats being signed sequentially.
If ontrats with agents an be onluded simultaneously and agents an
not ollude, entralization is superior in Maho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo
(1998).
The artile by Vafai (2005) analyzes moral hazard in monitoring under
delegation to a middleman or entralization. The middleman does not have
a superior monitoring tehnology and just serves to prevent the prinipal
from onealing positive information, i.e. a high output of the agent. On
the other hand, when involving a middleman, ollusion may our either
between the agent and the middleman or the middleman and the prinipal.
The respetive osts of both souring systems determine their superiority.
The artile by Vafai (2005) diers in analyzing monitoring, not eort that
determines suess, and does not have an informational advantage of the
13
In Baliga and Sjöström (1998) ollusion is not possible when the prourer introdues
randomized wages. Then the agents an not be sure to pay bribes beause they are
limited liable and the required bribe may exeed the wage they reeive. Another way to
have ollusion break down are seret messages.
14
The prinipal ould forbid or monitor ollusion between the agents.
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middleman. Thus it only limitedly applies to the situation in the automotive
industry.
3.2.3 Hierarhies and ostly information proessing
Pioneered by Radner (1992) and Radner (1993), this strand of literature
disusses the design of eient hierarhies given that agents have only a lim-
ited information proessing ability in a given time. Thus the organizational
form that an proess a given number of tasks in the minimum time given
a ertain number of proessors or agents is being sought. An organization,
in the denition of Radner (1993), is eient if for a given number of tasks
the number of proessors an not be dereased without inreasing the dei-
sion time or vie versa. The optimal solution to this problem is a "redued
tree" whih orresponds to an intermediate hierarhial organization where
some deisions are delegated to intermediary managers and others entrally
deided by the prinipal. The artiles by Shulte and Grüner (2007) and
Grüner and Shulte (2005) add the quality of deisions to this setup, assum-
ing that agents an only imperfetly proess information. In Shulte and
Grüner (2007) the information proessing tehnology is exogenously given
and the "redued tree" is again shown to outperform entralization as well
as full delegation, both in the dimensions of deision speed, osts, and quality.
In Grüner and Shulte (2005), it is assumed that agents an endogenously
provide eort to better proess information. In general, the authors nd that
deentralization per se has a positive eet beause it redues the deisions
and thus osts per agent. As before, the "redued tree" outperforms all other
organizational forms. Other artiles with similar results are Van Zandt and
Radner (2001) or Van Zandt (1999).
A limited ability of information proessing in its strit denition as in
Radner (1993) should be less relevant to the automotive industry as we an
safely assume that the OEM will always be able to employ more sta in pro-
urement and development to be able to proess all information, if desired.
15
The artile Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1992) takes another ap-
proah and assumes that the messages that agents an exhange are limited.
Thus entralization an not ollet all information from agents. Delegation
then outperforms entralization if the prinipal an monitor prodution as-
signments or payments between the agents ex post. Another aspet may be
that not agents' messages are limited but that ontingenies in ontrats are
onstrained, i.e. there is a limited ontrat omplexity. This is disussed in
Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1997) and leads to delegation as the
15
Potentially though at inreasing marginal osts.
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preferred outome if the gain through better information proessing under
delegation outweighs the ontroll loss through asymmetri information.
3.2.4 Empirial researh on direted business
The earliest work on direted business in the automotive industry is Girshik
(2002). The author nds that under opportunisti behavior of the tier 1
supplier, either the OEM or the sub-supplier may initiate direted business.
Direted business is also laimed to lead to eieny losses, but these are
not quantied. The ndings are based on ase study interviews in a very
narrowly dened range of vehile parts as well as experimental results, not
on a broad set of data.
In Klibano and Novak (2003), the authors provide an empirial analy-
sis of direted business based on interviews and data on parts soured for
luxury vehiles. The authors nd that more omplex produts and direted
business individually inrease the pries of the soured parts. However, when
observed together, prourement pries derease. This result is driven by the
assumption that the OEM hooses a lower aeptable quality under direted
business. Yet quality itself is not observed in the authors' data. Klibano
and Novak (2003) also note that the responsibility for failures is shifted from
the tier 1 supplier to the prouring OEM in the ase of direted business.
Thus the inentives to provide eort for quality are redued on the tier 1
level.
3.2.5 Summary
In an asymmetri information setting, delegation in general leads to a double
marginalization of rents as disussed for example in Mookherjee and Tsuma-
gari (2004) and therefore is dominated by entralized prourement. This
disadvantage may be outweighed if delegation ours to a suiently better
informed middleman or if proessing of information is limited as in Melumad,
Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1997). Under omplementarity of eort, del-
egation is equally superior, provided there is a better informed middleman
as shown in Baliga and Sjöström (1998). Whether omplementarity of eort
without a better informed middleman leads to delegation is not speially
disussed.
A theoretial model that inorporates asymmetri information as well as
moral hazard with or without limited information proessing still remains
to be developed. Espeially interesting in this respet may be to evaluate
a potential trade-o between double marginalization of information rents,
whih favors entralization, and omplementarity of eort, whih may indue
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delegation. The informational advantage of the potential middleman, i.e. the
ability to observe osts or eort of the agents may then interat both eets
and thus inuene the trade-o. Suh a model will represent more losely
the situation that we onsider in the automotive industry. Prourers will in
general be faed both with imperfet information of their suppliers' osts and
unobservable eort.
Our analysis will ontribute empirial evidene to the development of
suh a unied model. In addition, we test the existing theory against our
ndings. We also dier from the existing empirial works in several aspets.
First of all, our data set is larger and broader ompared to both Girshik
(2002) and Klibano and Novak (2003). In addition, our theoretial predi-
tions dier. While Klibano and Novak (2003), as well as partially Girshik
(2002), predit an inrease of the prourement prie in direted business,
the theoretial literature on hierarhies and delegation, as well as our own
ndings, indiates the opposite. Also we will inlude a muh wider array of
fators that may inuene direted business into our analysis.
3.3 Data desription
We analyze a ross-setion data set generated during a survey of the Ger-
man automotive industry assoiation, the Verband Deutsher Automobilun-
ternehmen e.V. (VDA), that was undertaken in 2007. In the survey, suppliers
were asked to haraterize the prourement behavior of their dierent OEM
ustomers for a representative sample of parts in their produt portfolio. The
survey overed eleven automotive manufaturers, whih are all major play-
ers in the worldwide automotive market. These OEMs also represent nearly
all prodution apaity of passenger vehiles as well as truks in Germany.
Nine suppliers, all members of the VDA, partiipated in the survey and were
seleted to provide a broad piture of the parts produed in the supplier
industry. The survey involved all relevant departments in these rms, sales,
researh and development, prodution, quality management, logistis and af-
tersales. Within the supplier departments, 376 employees partiipated in the
survey.
Table 3.1 presents a list and denition of the variables that will be
used in the following disussion. These inlude harateristia of the sup-
plier parts (Compet, Complex, V olF luct), the frequeny of quality prob-
lems (QualProb) and their assoiated osts (QualCost), the frequeny of
prie renegotiations during the prodution lifeyle (Renegot), the size of
prie redution (PriceRed) as well as the frequeny of direted business
(DirectBus). Also the sharing of development eort between the OEM and
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suppliers is overed (DevShareSS, DevShareT1, DevShareOEM). These
harateristia are all given on the level of the tier 1 produt. Unfortunately,
information about the produts of sub-suppliers that go into the spei tier
1 produt is laking. The only observation that we have in this respet is the
share of development eort that the sub-supplier undertakes.
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistis of the variables. The data set
ontains 214 parts that were supplied diretly to the OEMs. On average, we
observe that direted business (DirectBus) ourred in more than 20 perent
of all ases. Average prie redutions (PriceRed) are on the upper limit on
the interval of 5 − 10 perent.16 Renegotiations beause of eieny gains
(Renegot) ourred in almost half of the ases.
In table 3.2 the number of observations per variable varies onsiderably.
Consequently, the data set ontains a signiant share of missing responses.
This will be important to remember in the eonometri analysis of the data
set.
Unavoidably, the data are subjet to a seletion bias. None of the suppli-
ers was exposed to bankrupty risk or is expeted to be so in the lose future.
The respondent rms are all major market partiipants with a long standing
in the market. Irrespetively of produing low-value, simple or high-value,
advaned parts, the suppliers may have onsiderably more bargaining power
towards an OEM than the average supplier in the industry. Also, the data set
ontains missing values. Certain questions may not have been lled out by
respondents on purpose. For example, it is open to debate whether suppliers
would truthfully report if there were grave quality problems that may also
have aused disruptions in their relationship with the OEM.
Before proeeding to the following setion, we would also like to highlight
a number of important harateristis of the automotive industry. Souring
deisions in the automotive industry are always made by the OEM who
manages the overall projet, i.e., the development and prodution of a new
vehile model. After a preliminary onept phase, the OEM deides whih
parts of the vehile will be proured from outside and how outsouring will
be organized. All parts of a vehile are perfet omplements and may be
interating with eah other spatially and also funtionally. Vehile parts are
also spei to a ertain vehile model or platform. Developing and produing
them involves high spei investments that reate the potential for hold-up.
The market partiipants though interat with eah other repeatedly and
also potentially in several markets at the same time. In general, a supplier
16
Please note that responses about prie redutions were given in intervals with the
highest interval, orresponding to prie redutions above 20 perent, is open. Thus an
average prie redution in the sample an not be aurately alulated. The average
response is measured at 2.958.
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Tab. 3.1: Variable desription
Variable Sale Desription
DiretBus Never - very frequently Frequeny that the OEM has diretly
(6 - sale) negotiated with sub-suppliers of the
tier 1 supplier during the last ve
years
QualProb Very rarely - very frequently Frequeny of quality problems
(5 - sale) during prodution
QualCost Very low - very high Size of the ost that oured in the
(5 - sale) ase of quality problems
CostTransp Very rarely - very frequently Frequeny that the tier 1 supplier's
(5 - sale) osts were made transparent to the
OEM
Renegot Never - very frequently Frequeny of renegotiations during
(6 - sale) the produt lifeyle beause of
eieny gains of the supplier
PrieRed <5% - >20% Average prie redution over the
(6 - sale) produt lifeyle
DevShareSS <20% - >80% Share of development eort by
(5 - sale) the sub-supplier
DevShareT1 <20% - >80% Share of development eort by the
(5 - sale) tier 1 supplier
DevShareOEM <20% - >80% Share of the OEM's development
(5 - sale) eort
Testing 1 - 5 Responsibility for testing,
(5 - sale) 1 = tier 1 supplier, 5 = OEM
QualResp Never - very frequently Frequeny that the tier 1 supplier
(6 - sale) was held responsible for quality
problems, given testing by the OEM
RDsta <2% - >8% Share of employees in researh and
(5 - sale) development
Compet Very low - very high Intensity of ompetition in the tier 1
(5 - sale) market
Complex Very low - very high Complexity of the part's interfaes
(5 - sale) to the vehile
VolFlut <+/-10% - > +/-70% Possible utuations of prodution
(5 - sale) volume speied in supply ontrats
DUMMYPREM - Dummy variable if a premium OEM
is supplied
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Tab. 3.2: Summary statistis of variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
DiretBus 0.215 0.248 0 0.9 214
QualProb 0.211 0.136 0.1 0.9 123
QualCost 3.008 1.255 1 5 121
CostTransp 0.426 0.27 0.1 0.9 157
Renegot 0.471 0.306 0 0.9 153
PrieRed 2.958 1.142 1 5 142
DevShareSS 0.203 0.189 0.1 0.9 185
DevShareT1 0.602 0.257 0.1 0.9 185
DevShareOEM 0.338 0.21 0.1 0.9 141
Testing 2.833 0.989 1 5 168
QualResp 0.568 0.261 0 0.9 154
RDsta 0.043 0.031 0.01 0.09 131
Compet 1.601 0.789 1 5 148
Complex 3.372 1.077 1 5 148
VolFlut 0.175 0.093 0.05 0.8 146
DUMMYPREM 0.486 0.501 0 1 214
produes dierent parts for dierent vehiles of the same OEM, repeatedly.
In Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) a more detailed disussion of these
eonomially interesting aspets is provided.
3.4 Hypotheses on the use of direted business
Based on the previously disussed literature, hypotheses to explain direted
business in automotive prourement an be derived. In this ontext, auto-
motive OEMs are faing problems of asymmetri information, moral hazard
as well as inomplete ontrats and ostly information proessing. Asymmet-
ri information largely onerns the prodution osts of the suppliers, whih
also hange onsiderable during the vehile model lifetime due to learning
urve eets. The supplier's eort to provide a suient quality of the parts
is the largest driver of moral hazard. Contrats are inomplete, espeially
regarding expeted prodution volumes or the design of parts prior to the de-
velopment stage.
17
The deision to engage in direted business will be based
on the ombination of all these aspets. Below, we will refer to the situation
without direted business as delegated souring.
17
Please refer to Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) for a more detailed disussion of
these aspets in automotive prourement.
66 Chapter 3. Delegation and Hierarhies
3.4.1 Supplier eort for quality
Vehile reliability is a major onern for onsumers and thus automotive
manufaturers. Ensuring that only awless parts are built into a vehile
and that these parts will also not fail when interating with other parts of
the vehile is one of the key determinant of suess. Having to reall and
repair vehiles is not only ostly but an lead to a signiant reputational
loss for the OEM and potentially the supplier. Suppliers' eort for higher
reliability an thus be interpreted along the lines of Baliga and Sjöström
(1998). Thus we predit that under delegated souring, inentives to provide
eort for quality are higher and thus parts failure rates lower, espeially for
the tier 1 supplier. The superiority of delegation in Baliga and Sjöström
(1998) is among others based on the fat that the agent that is delegated to
observes the quality of the sub-supplier's produt. We onsider this not to
hold for a wide range of parts for two reasons. First of all, quality will never
be perfetly observable before a part is built into a vehile and nally used
by the ustomer. Monitoring quality at some stage will have prohibitively
inreasing marginal ost. Also, in many instanes, the OEM himself may be
able to observe the sub-supplier's quality equally well as the tier 1 supplier,
thus there is no informational advantage.
Nevertheless, quality inentives will be higher under independent souring
when we onsider omplementarity eets between parts. Under delegated
souring, the tier 1 supplier will be responsible for the quality of the whole
set of parts that he supplies to the OEM. On the other hand, under direted
business, the tier 1 supplier will usually refuse to be held responsible for all
quality issues related to the sub-supplier. The tier 1 supplier will always
laim that the OEM's seletion of the wrong sub-supplier was the ause of
quality problems and that if he had only been able to hoose his own, better
supplier, these issues would not have ourred. This shift of responsibility
is observed in Klibano and Novak (2003) and was also mentioned in the
interviews that have been onduted by Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007).
The impat of the shift in responsibility is more pronouned the more the
failure of one part indues failure of another part and the ause of failure is not
perfetly identiable ex post. Under delegated souring, the tier 1 supplier
will nevertheless be liable for failure. Under direted business, he will not be
liable, at least as long as his part an not be learly identied as responsible.
Therefore his inentives to engage in eort that inreases quality will be
higher under delegated souring. A simple model that formally illustrates
this eet is presented in the Appendix 3.7.
Hypothesis 1 (Quality inentives). An inreased degree of direted business
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Besides the impat on quality inentives, limited liability may also be a
signiant driver for delegated souring. As disussed before, under direted
business the tier 1 supplier will not take over responsibility for failure of parts
of the sub-supplier. Under delegated souring, he takes over responsibility for
failures aross the whole set of parts, independently from the identiation
of the ause of failure. If the sub-supplier is identied responsible, the tier 1
supplier reoups the failure osts from the sub-supplier.
18
In a situation with
limited liability, delegated souring thus leads to two suppliers being liable,
in the rst stage the tier 1 supplier and seondly the sub-supplier. Even if
the sub-supplier is insolvent, the tier 1 supplier will still have to ompensate
the OEM for failure. Thus the negative eet of suppliers' limited liability on
the OEM is redued under delegated souring. In addition, tier 1 suppliers
tend to be larger than sub-suppliers. They have larger sales volumes and
larger balane sheets, thus the risk of their insolveny is lower. The artile
by Mookherjee (2006) hints at this aspet by mentioning that delegation may
be a seond best solution when "the prime ontrator is a large rm with deep
pokets".
19
Also Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) identify limited liability
to be potentially important with parts that have a low prie but indue
high osts if they fail. To test the impat of limited liability empirially, we
require data where either tier 1 suppliers signiantly vary in balane sheet
strength or where we an dierentiate between sub-supplier produts that
vary aording to the nanial strength of the supplier and the ratio of prie
versus failure osts. As our data set does not ontain this information, we
abstain from analyzing the aspet further.
3.4.2 Informational rents of the tier 1 supplier
As stressed in the literature on hierarhies under asymmetri information,
delegation will lead to a double marginalization of rents.
20
In the automotive
industry, the OEM will equally not know the prodution osts of his suppliers,
neither before ontrating nor afterwards. Also osts hange onsiderably
18
This is due to the hierarhial ontrating struture. Under delegated souring, the
OEM only ontrats with the tier 1 supplier and the tier 1 subsequently with the sub-
supplier. All payments ow aordingly. Details of this aspet may also be found in




See among others Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995) or Melumad,
Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1995).
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over the prodution yle due to learning urve eets. Direted business
allows the OEM to learn the prie of the parts of the sub-supplier. Thus
the ost struture of the tier 1 supplier will beome more transparent to the
OEM. This will redue the double marginalization rent of the tier 1 supplier
as disussed in Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995) or
Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1995).
In the data, we an not diretly observe the size of rents of the tier 1 sup-
plier, yet there are seond order eets that indiate their size or respetively
their redution under direted business. In the automotive industry, learning
urve eets lead to renegotiations between suppliers and OEMs, as Müller,
Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) nd.
21
Better information about sub-supplier
osts through direted business will indue the OEM to more frequently
renegotiate pries with the tier 1 supplier. Thus we expet more frequent
renegotiations under direted business.
Hypothesis 2 (Cost transpareny). Direted business will inrease the trans-




Hypothesis 3 (Renegotiation). With an inreased degree of ost trans-
pareny, the OEM will renegotiate pries more frequently with the tier 1





Hypothesis 4 (Prie redutions). More frequent renegotiations will lead to




Of ourse, prie redutions may also be driven by other fators, e.g. er-
tain produt or market harateristis.
21
It is not ommon pratie in the industry to write ontrats with xed prie dereases
over time or pries depending on produed volumes. Instead renegotiations are frequently
used.
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3.4.3 Information advantage of the tier 1 supplier
As shown in Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) or Laont and Martimort
(1998), the disadvantages of delegation due to a double marginalization of
rents may be alleviated or even oset when the prinipal an delegate to
a better informed middleman. An informed tier 1 supplier will be able to
better evaluate the osts and learning urve eets of the sub-supplier. Thus
the value of delegated souring should inrease in the degree of information
that the tier 1 supplier has over the sub-supplier. Also the value of delegated
souring should inrease in the information advantage of the tier 1 supplier
relative the prouring OEM.
How well informed the tier 1 supplier is relative to its sub-supplier an
be evaluated on their sharing of development eort. When the sub-supplier
undertakes a higher share in the overall development, the informational ad-
vantage of the tier 1 supplier should derease, and vie versa.
Hypothesis 5 (Information advantage relative to the sub-supplier). The
more development eort the sub-supplier undertakes relative to the tier 1
supplier, the less well informed will the tier 1 supplier be about the sub-
supplier's osts. Consequently, the probability of observing direted business







A seond line of arguments also supports hypothesis 5. Direted business
redues the inentives of the tier 1 supplier to provide eort as disussed in
hypothesis 1. Applying the same argument not on produing high quality,
but on developing a good and reliable produt also supports the expetation
that the tier 1 supplier's share of development eort dereases in direted
business.
The information advantage of the tier 1 supplier relative to the OEM is
redued when the OEM takes over a signiant share of the development
eort of the tier 1 part, beause of the tehnial understanding that the
OEM then gains. In this respet, it is important to understand that the
OEM always takes over some share of the development work of every part
of a vehile. The responsibility for the overall vehile implies that the OEM
manages and oordinates the various suppliers' development ativities. To a
ertain degree, an OEM will then always be involved in the design and proto-
typing of eah part. The more the OEM engages in suh oordination eort,
the more informational asymmetries between himself and the tier 1 supplier
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are redued, making direted business more likely. On the other hand, it is
also easy to argue that direted business in fat indues the OEM to engage
more in oordinating ativities, that is seleting and later on managing the
sub-suppliers himself.
Hypothesis 6 (Information advantage relative to the OEM). With an in-
reased share of development done by the OEM, the informational advantage
of the tier 1 supplier dereases. Thus the probability of observing direted
business inreases. Causality may also go in the opposite diretion suh that




There may be systemati dierenes in informational asymmetries de-
pending on the harateristis of the proured tier 1 part. We expet that
more innovative tier 1 parts will be less well understood by the OEM. Teh-
nially advaned parts, like for example eletroni systems, will require high
xed R&D osts. Thus the OEM will have a lower inentive or ability to
engage in development ativities of those parts. Instead, the tier 1 supplier
will be taking over a higher share of the development eort.
Hypothesis 7 (Innovative tier 1 parts). The more innovative a tier 1 produt





The same line of argument an be applied when omparing the develop-
ment eort of the tier 1 supplier to that of its sub-supplier. Unfortunately
our data set does not ontain the required observations on the sub-supplier
part level to be able to test this hypothesis as we only observe the sub-
suppliers development eort, (DevShareSS), but not the harateristis of
his supplied part.
Innovative produts may also be more prone to quality problems beause
suppliers have less experiene in produing and testing them, potentially
further inuening the OEMs deision for or against direted business. We
will validate whether this expetation holds in Setion 3.5.
3.4.4 Intensity of ompetition in the tier 1 market
As stressed by Baron and Besanko (1992), Gilbert and Riordan (1995) or
Melumad, Mookherjee, and Reihelstein (1995), the middleman will earn an
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informational rent under delegation. It orresponds to standard eonomi
theory that an inrease in ompetition in the tier 1 market will indue a
redution in rents. The OEMs should then also benet from inreased trans-
pareny about suppliers' osts. The same line of argument an as well be
applied to the impat of ompetition on the inentives of suppliers and we
would thus expet higher supplier eort under more ompetition. If ompe-
tition inreases ost transpareny, dereases suppliers' rents, as well as in-
reases inentives to provide eort, we should observe less direted business
in more ompetitive tier 1 markets.
Hypothesis 8 (Competition). Inreasing ompetition in the tier 1 market







Competition in the supplier market may also be dierent when produts
are more innovative. In general, we would expet to have less ompetition in
more innovative produt markets due to the higher xed R&D osts involved
in development.
3.4.5 Objetive of the OEM
Automotive OEMs are generally divided into two main subgroups. Premium
OEMs produe fewer, more luxurious or exlusive vehiles and volume OEMs
produe larger quantities of heaper vehiles. The respetive OEM strategy
will inuene the OEMs' objetive funtion also in prourement. Premium
OEMs will tend to plae a higher emphasis on the uniqueness and quality of
the parts they proure while volume OEMs should rather fous on low pro-
urement pries. If hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 hold, this should also inuene
the deision on direted business.
Hypothesis 9 (OEM Objetive). Premium OEMs will exhibit fewer quality
problems in their vehiles and be less onerned with suppliers' ost trans-
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The above arguments for hypothesis 9 all imply that premium OEMs
should engage in less direted business. One ounterargument may be that
premium OEMs are equally about quality on the sub-supplier level. Even if
direted business may redue quality inentives of the tier 1 supplier as dis-
ussed in hypothesis 1, it may inrease quality inentives of the sub-supplier.
This eet may our beause the sub-supplier an extrat more rents from
the OEM under direted business, given that there is no double marginal-
ization problem as put forward by hypothesis 2. Due to the lak of data on
the sub-supplier level, this argument an not be tested. However, we will
attempt to address this point qualitatively in the following setion.
Premium OEMs may also have a preferene for more innovative tier 1
produts. Thus the eets of hypothesis 7 would indue less direted business
by premium OEMs. On the other hand, premium OEMs may also have a
preferene for more innovative sub-supplier produts. Then the informational
advantage of the tier 1 supplier will derease as disussed in hypothesis 5. In
this ase, the probability of direted business should inrease.
3.4.6 Summary
From the above, we expet the basi trade-o in the deision for or against
direted business to be the following:
1. By engaging in direted business, the OEM eliminates double marginal-
ization by the tier 1 supplier and thus an proure at lower pries.
2. If the tier 1 supplier has superior information about the sub-supplier,
this may overompensate the double marginalization problem, thus in-
duing less direted business.
3. By engaging in direted business, the tier 1 supplier's inentives to pro-
vide high quality are redued, thus the probability of failures inreases.
This goes against the interest of the OEM.
The type of produt proured, notably the degree of innovation of the
produt, and the strategy of the OEM may inuene the above trade-o and
thus have an impat on direted business. By engaging in direted business,
the OEM also inurs transation osts. These omprise the osts immanent in
seleting and ontrating with the sub-supplier. These xed osts also weight
against the redution in prourement pries through direted business.
Causality may also go into the opposite diretion ompared to the theo-
retial predition. In partiular, one may argue that the OEM will engage in
direted business one he observes quality problems on the tier 1 level. Thus
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direted business is a measure to inrease, not derease quality. If this holds,
the trade-o faed by the OEM would be between reduing prodution pries
and inreasing quality versus the transation osts of direted business.
3.5 Empirial ndings
3.5.1 Desriptive statistis and orrelations
We rst return to the summary statistis in table 3.2. Direted business
(DirectBus) on average ours in 22 perent of all ases. It has a high
standard deviation of 25 perent.
22
Table 3.7 in the Appendix 3.8 presents
the frequeny distribution of responses. Here we nd that in 37 perent
of the ases, direted business never ours. In 20 perent of the ases,
respondents stated that direted business ours with a probability of 50
perent or higher. Thus direted business is a strategy that OEMs employ
in spei parts, potentially very frequently. On the other hand, in a high
share of their proured parts, they hoose not to engage in direted business
at all.
Table 3.8 in the Appendix 3.8 provides the ross-orrelations of the vari-
ables analyzed. These will be used as a rst indiation on the hypotheses
derived in setion 3.4.
We observe a positive orrelation between quality problems (QualProb)
and direted business (DirectBus) at the ten perent signiane level. Nev-
ertheless ausality may go in both diretions. If hypothesis 1 holds, direted
business indues less quality eort, otherwise lower quality may indue more
direted business. We also observe a negative orrelation between respon-
sibility of the tier 1 supplier for quality problems (QualResp) and direted
business at the one perent signiane level.
23
This in our view is a strong
indiation that hypothesis 1 holds and that quality problems are a results
of direted business and therefore lower quality responsibility of the tier 1
supplier. The same aspet is supported by the responses in table 3.9. Under
direted business
24
, the OEM is more responsible for solving quality problems
than when the tier 1 supplier selets his sub-supplier
25
. These ndings also
orrespond to the assumptions and results of the simple model presented in
22
The average and standard deviation are alulated by evaluating the responses at the
averages of their respetive probability interval, i.e. "Never" orresponds to 0 perent and
"Very frequently" to 90 perent probability.
23
Note also that we observe less testing by the OEM under direted business (Testing),
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Appendix 3.7.
Between ost transpareny (CostTransp) and direted business a posi-
tive orrelation is found, onrming hypothesis 2 at the one perent signi-
ane level. Furthermore, ost transpareny and the frequeny of renegotia-
tions (Renegot) are positively orrelated at the one perent signiane level,
whih supports hypothesis 3. We observe no orrelation neither between prie
redutions (PriceRed) and ost transpareny nor prie redutions and rene-
gotiation, hinting against hypothesis 4. We presume that responses regard-
ing prie redutions may be overlaid by other fators not related to direted
business or that responses may be biased in this very sensitive area of the
questionnaire. At least there is no obvious reason why inreased ost trans-
pareny and more frequent renegotiations should not lead to higher prie
redutions.
Conrming hypothesis 5, the data exhibit a positive orrelation between
the share of development eort by the sub-supplier (DevShareSS) and di-
reted business at the one perent signiane level, as well as the orrespond-
ing negative orrelation between the share of development eort by the tier 1
supplier (DevShareT1) and direted business at the ve perent signiane
level. We also nd a positive orrelation between the development eort of
the OEM (DevShareOEM) and direted business as expeted from hypoth-
esis 6. In addition, the development eort of the OEM orrelates negatively
with quality problems (QualProb). Furthermore, there is a strong positive
orrelation between development and testing by the OEM (Testing). Also, if
the OEM engages in more development and testing, the tier supplier is held
less responsible for quality problems (QualResp). These orrelations do not
ontradit a hypothesis that the OEM engages in direted business exatly
in produts with quality issues and tries to resolve those.
Innovative tier 1 produts (RDstaff)26 are negatively orrelated with the
development eort of the OEM at the one perent signiane level, whih
onrms hypothesis 7. However, we do not observe a signiant orrelation
between innovative tier 1 produts and the share of development eort by
the tier 1 supplier, the seond and more obvious part of hypothesis 7. In-
26
Measuring the innovativeness of a produt is subjet to interpretation by the respon-
dent. We thus opted to use a more objetive measure of innovativeness. The investment in
R&D eort and the number of patents are readily available onepts. However, as patent-
ing an innovation is a strategi deision and may not be undertaken, a fat that was also
found to be espeially relevant in the interviews onduted by Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler
(2007), we measure R&D eort by the share of engineers employed in development. In
some literature, the perentage point of sales invested in R&D is also used, but this in-
evitably depends on sales volumes and thus may be less omparable between ompanies
or produts.
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novativeness also interats with a number of other variables signiantly. A
higher degree of innovativeness is related to less direted business, more ost
transpareny and higher prie redutions. The rst observation is expeted,
the seond and third may be due to the fat that there are more learning
urve eets in innovative produts, thus higher prie redutions and in this
ontext also inreased ost transpareny. Also it is important to note that the
latter orrelations are based on a signiantly lower number of observations
than other orrelations and that therefore responses may be biased.
Regarding hypothesis 8, we nd no signiant orrelation between the
intensity of ompetition on the tier 1 level (Compet) and ost transpareny,
development eort of the tier 1 supplier, or direted business.
Hypothesis 9, laiming that premium OEMs (DUMMY PREM) have
less quality problems on the supplier level (QualProb) and try to obtain less
ost transpareny (CostTransp), is not onrmed by statistially signiant
bivariate orrelations. Instead, we observe a positive orrelation between
being a premium OEM and engaging in direted business at the one per-
ent signiane level. Two possible explanations for this observation an be
oered. First of all, hypothesis 9 holds and premium OEMs ahieve overall
higher quality. Yet, as noted before, they trade o quality on the sub-supplier
level, whih is not observed in our data, to quality on the tier 1 level. When
OEMs do in fat are more about quality on the sub-supplier level, they will
hoose more direted business. The seond explanation is that hypothesis
9 does not hold, even if this ontradits the ommon understanding of the
objetives of a premium OEM. To assess whih explanation applies, we an
evaluate the answers of respondents when diretly asked about the OEMs'
motivating fators for direted business. In the survey, respondents ould
selet out of at most 20 reasons for direted business and assess their impor-
tane. Table 3.10 provides the summary of the responses aross OEM types,
table 3.11 only the responses regarding premium OEMs, and table 3.12 re-
garding volume OEMs.
27
Overall, the most important reasons for direted
business are that the OEM an gain information about osts from suppliers
and the pries of the parts proured
28
. Nevertheless, also quality is regarded
as important.
29
Aording to tables 3.11 and 3.12, premium OEMs in general
put a higher importane to all reasons. However, the importane of quality
relative to prie is idential for premium and volume OEMs. Therefore, hy-
pothesis 9 may in fat not hold and prourement strategies may not dier
signiantly between OEM types.
27
Inluding OEMs produing truks.
28
See table 3.10, questions 2, 5, and 6.
29
See question 7.
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3.5.2 Eonometri results
Hypothesis 1 to 3 treat direted business as the independent variable inu-
ening quality inentives and prourement pries. In deiding for or against
direted business, the OEM will of ourse be aware of these eets. Thus
the deision to engage in direted business is, aording to our hypotheses,
a deision for more ost transpareny, leading to more frequent renegotia-
tions and lower pries, but that in return aepts lower quality inentives
on the tier 1 supplier level. In addition, the sharing of development eort
between the OEM, the tier 1 supplier and the sub-supplier may hange. In
the eonometri model, direted business will be treated as the dependent
variable and ost transpareny, quality problems and development sharing as
independents. However, all these variables are endogenous. An instrumental
variables estimation is thus applied to address simultaneity.
When determining the regression model, we again fae the problem of
missing data on the sub-supplier produt level. Thus instrumenting the shar-
ing of development eort between the tier 1 supplier and the sub-supplier is
not possible. Therefore, we will estimate a redued, but instrumented model
in a rst stage. In a seond stage and for the purpose of omparison, we also
estimate an non-instrumented but broader model. The instrumented model
is proposed as follows, with the parameters β representing the oeients of
the regression, δ the oeients of the instruments30, Z the matrix of instru-
ments and ǫ the error terms. Variables with a line on top are instrumented.
DirectBus = β0 + βQual ·QualProb+ βTrans · CostTransp
+βDevOEM ·DevShareOEM + ǫ
with
QualProb = δQual0 + δ
QualZ + ǫQual
CostTransp = δTrans0 + δ
TransZ + ǫTrans
DevShareOEM = δDevOEM0 + δ
DevOEMZ + ǫDevOEM
Z = QualCost, RDstaff, Complex,
Compet,DUMMY PREM.(3.10)
As instruments Z we propose the osts of quality problems (QualCost),
whih is independent of who pays these osts, the innovativeness (RDstaff),
the omplexity of the tier 1 part (Complex), intensity of ompetition (Compet),
30
Please note that as Z is a matrix, δ as speied here is a matrix as well, exept for
the respetive δ0 oeients.
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the utuation range of prodution volumes (V olF luct) and the dummy vari-
able for premium OEMs (DUMMY PREM). Complexity is measured by
the amount of tehnial interfaes that a part has with the rest of the ar
in prodution. Interfaes during prodution are largely determined by the
nature of the part onerned, and not by produt design. Therefore om-
plexity is onsidered largely exogenous. Furthermore, innovativeness in this
ontext is onsidered to be largely exogenous. Indeed the OEM deides how
tehnially innovative a part should be. However, this deision is exoge-
nous to the deision how to proure suh a part. In addition, we measure
innovativeness by the R&D eort that the supplier exerts in this kind of
produt in general, whih also should be largely exogenous. Supply on-
trats usually speify utuation ranges of future prodution volumes that
imply menus of pries. This reets the suppliers' need to be ompensated
for his xed osts. By inluding these volume and prie menus in ontrats,
the OEM an assess xed versus variable osts of the supplier better and
thus ost transpareny inreases. Thus the utuation range of prodution
volumes (V olF luct) an serve as an instrument for ost transpareny. Also
the OEM's strategy, premium or volume, and the intensity of ompetition in
the tier 1 supplier market are exogenous to the model onsidered and thus
serve as instruments.
In a seond step, we evaluate for the same sample whether higher ost
transpareny indues more frequent prie renegotiations and whether prie
renegotiations indue higher prie redutions. We will then instrument these
variables by direted business.
Renegot = βRenegot0 + β
Renegot · CostTransp+ ǫRenegot
with
CostTransp = δCostTransp0 + δ
CostTranspDirectBus + ǫCostTransp.(3.11)
PriceRed = βPriceRed0 + β
PriceRed · Renegot+ ǫPriceRed
with
Renegot = δRenegot0 + δ
RenegotDirectBus + ǫRenegot.(3.12)
Table 3.3 presents the results of the linear two-stage least squares regres-
sion regarding direted business aording to model 3.10.
31
31
We are well aware of the fat that more advaned eonometri models than a lin-
ear regression may be suitable to our data, espeially given the interval-oded responses
reeived and the distribution of responses. As the theoretial model also implies an inten-
sive instrumentation of variables, the linear regression still provides the most stable and
reliable model to use, espeially taken into aount the size of the available data set.
78 Chapter 3. Delegation and Hierarhies
Tab. 3.3: Instrumental variable regression: Direted business (DirectBus) as de-
pendent variable



















Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
As suggested by ross-orrelations, ost transpareny (CostTransp) is
signiant at the ten perent level in the regression and thus identied as a
motivating fator for direted business, as predited by hypothesis 2. The
development eort of the OEM (DevShareOEM) is even more strongly sig-
niant in the regression and is shown to inrease almost in parallel with the
degree of direted business as βDevOEM is lose to 0.9. This onrms hypoth-
esis 6. A higher oeient of the OEMs development is not surprising if we
onsider that under direted business the OEM will at least take over the
more oordination work of development. Thus the interation between di-
reted business and development eort of the OEM is muh more immediate
than that between ost transpareny and direted business. Contrary to the
ross-orrelations, we do not nd that quality problems (QualProb) have a
signiant impat on direted business as stated in hypothesis 1. This result
an stem from two eets. First of all, the sample that forms the basis of
the regression is small, due to missing values in one or several of the vari-
ables onerned. Thus a signiant share of observations that were inluded
in ross-orrelations have fallen out of the analysis. Seond, the instrumen-
tation of the independent variables, notably quality problems, may not be
perfet.
Tables 3.13 to 3.15 in the Appendix 3.8 present the regressions for the
respetive instruments. The frequeny of quality problems is only weakly ex-
plained by the main instrument, the osts of suh problems, whih is poten-
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tially the reason for the insigniane in the regression on direted business.
The most dominant instrument explaining the share of development eort is
innovativeness, as predited by hypothesis 7. Cost transpareny is explained
by innovativeness and the utuation range of prodution volumes, both at
the ve perent level.
To validate whether the variables employed are valid instruments, we
also perform a standard linear regression with both independent variables
and instruments, the results of whih are presented in table 3.4. None of
the instruments is signiant on its own, onrming their appliability as
instruments. In table 3.4, it an also be observed that ost transpareny and
development eort of the OEM have a signiant impat on direted busi-
ness. Their respetive oeients though hange onsiderably. This result
is as expeted by standard eonometri theory as for example in Wooldridge
(2002) given the simultaneity problem and endogenous variables. Quality
again is not signiant.
Tab. 3.4: Linear regression: Direted business (DirectBus) as dependent variable,
all other variables assumed independent




















Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
It is important to observe that in neither model, also not for the instru-
mentation, the OEM strategy and the level of ompetition are important for
the results. We thus have to rejet hypotheses 8 and 9. As we are laking
instruments on the sharing of development eort between the tier 1 and the
sub-supplier, we will also for illustrative purposes perform a linear regres-
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sion inluding these variables, but without instruments. Table 3.16 in the
Appendix 3.8 presents the results and onrms again the signiane of ost
transpareny and development eort by the OEM. Furthermore, the share of
development undertaken by the sub-supplier is signiant towards direted
business at the ve perent level. This indiates that hypothesis 5 may in-
deed hold. Furthermore, it may be an explanation for direted business by
premium OEMs. As noted before, if the sub-produts are highly important
or their quality more ritial to the overall vehile than the quality of the tier
1 produt, direted business should be undertaken by premium OEMs more
frequently than by volume OEMs.
Given that ost transpareny has been identied as a signiant driver of
direted business, we turn to the seond model as presented in equations 3.11
and 3.12. Table 3.5 onrms that ost transpareny leads to more frequent
renegotiations at the ve perent signiane level in the linear two-stage
least squares regression. Also direted business is a valid instrument for
renegotiations. In turn, hypothesis 3 an be onrmed. On the other hand,
hypothesis 4 is rejeted in table 3.6. However, both regressions are based
on a lower number of observations than the previous data, making the re-
sults less stable. In addition, the strong signiane of ost transpareny
and renegotiation frequeny in the previous ndings still leads us to believe
that direted business is undertaken, among others, to ahieve lower pries.
This view, as disussed in the preeeeding hapter, is also supported by the
qualitative responses of the survey.
Tab. 3.5: Instrumental variable regression: renegotiation frequeny (Renegot) as
dependent variable












Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
The results of the eonometri analysis should be read with one impor-
tant aspet in mind. From over two hundred observations less than a quarter
remain in the regression, whih naturally redues the signiane of regres-
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Tab. 3.6: Instrumental variable regression: prie redutions (PriceRed) as depen-
dent variable










Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
sion results.
32
We thus believe that the results from ross-orrelations and
the regression have to be viewed in their ombination. The fat that both
regressions and ross-orrelations support the same hypotheses indiates that
our results are more stable than the regressions alone suggest. Even those
parts of the regression, that are not found signiant, but where the respe-
tive variables exhibit signiant orrelations, indiate, although weakly, that
the hypotheses in this respet an not be ompletely wrong.
3.6 Conlusion
We nd that direted business, or entralization of ontrating, leads to more
ost transpareny and more frequent renegotiations with the tier 1 supplier.
This in turn indiates a derease of informational rents of the supplier as
predited by theory. In this respet, our results ontradit Klibano and
Novak (2003). Direted business is hosen by the OEM to ahieve a higher
ost transpareny and thus eetively lower pries. Even though we an not
perfetly prove the latter point, we onsider it fairly obvious, as there is no
other reason for an OEM to seek more ost transpareny. We agree with
Klibano and Novak (2003) in the redution of quality under direted busi-
ness, even though our results are weak in this regard. The fat that tier 1
suppliers are less responsible for quality problems is nevertheless a onvining
argument in this diretion. It is not unrealisti to onlude that the redued
responsibility stems from the redued inorporation of omplementarity ef-
fets by the tier 1 supplier. One of the suppliers interviewed in the ourse of
Müller, Stahl, and Wahtler (2007) expliitly onrmed this line of thought
32
The data set thus ontains a high number of missing values in dierent variables.
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by stating that if the OEM seleted the sub-supplier, quality in this area
would be his responsibility, and not the responsibility of the tier 1 supplier.
Thus we an also provide positive evidene in this diretion of the theoreti
literature. Furthermore, we hope to be able to ontribute to the development
of a unied approah that inorporates both asymmetri information and the
provision of eort into a theoretial model.
From an industry point of view, we nd it very surprising that the dif-
ferene between premium and volume OEMs is low. Eventually, we ould
explain this phenomenon when analyzing the sub-supplier produts that are
proured through direted business by the dierent OEMs. Unfortunately,
our data set does not ontain the respetive data. Albeit weakly, our results
indiate that premium and volume OEMs have not yet realized the full impli-
ation of their prourement strategies and additional dierentiation would be
prot as well as eieny enhaning. We thus hope that additional researh
will be able to further ontribute to this disussion in the future.
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3.7 Appendix: Inentives for eort under delegation versus
entralization
Let us illustrate the inentives to provide eort for quality under direted
business DB versus delegated souring DS, i.e. when the tier 1 supplier
selets its sub-supplier himself. We onsider here a simple model of delegation
versus entralization as an adaptation from Baliga and Sjöström (1998) or
Maho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (1998).
Consider a tier 1 supplier T1 and a sub-supplier SS. Both hoose an
eort level to produe a quality qT1 and qSS respetively with qi,∈ [0, 1] with
i = [SS, T1]. Quality denotes the probability that the respetive produt
fails, i.e. needs to be replaed or repaired, thus a lower qi represents a higher
quality. Quantities supplied are normalized to 1. Prots of the suppliers are
determined by the prie for the part, the osts of providing a ertain quality
C(qi) and damages Di that are paid in the event of a failed part. The game
then evolves as follows:
1. The sub-supplier deides on his eort level and sets qSS.
2. The tier 1 supplier deides on his eort level and determines qT1.
3. The produt is delivered to the OEM and sold in the nal market.
4. The quality of the nal produt realizes, i.e. with probability qi part i
fails. With probability λ, λ ∈ [0, 1], failure of part i exerts a negative
externality on good j 6= i and indues it to fail as well. With tehni-
ally highly interrelated parts this is a ommon senario, onsider for
example a failing sealing that auses a ball-bearing to leak oil and thus
fail as well. We then have the following ases to onsider
(a) With probability qT1(1 − qSS)(1 − λ), part T1 fails and SS does
not fail.
(b) With probability qT1(1− qSS)λ, part T1 fails and auses part SS
to fail as well, even though SS was faultless.
() With probability qT1qSS , both parts are faulty and fail.
(d) With probability qSS(1− qT1)λ, part SS fails and auses part T1
to fail as well, even though T1 was faultless.
(e) With probability qSS(1 − qT1)(1 − λ), part SS fails and T1 does
not fail.
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5. When a part fails, the responsible supplier has to pay damages Di. The
damages represent the osts of repair and replaement of this part. In
the automotive industry, one of the key hallenges in this respet is
the ase of "trouble not found". A ertain share of failures in vehiles,
most ommonly in the ase of more advaned parts of the vehile, an
not be traed bak to the ause of failure. In this simplied model,
we assume than in all events where both parts fail, the soure of the
ause an not be identied. In this ase, direted business is handled
dierently from delegated souring
• Under delegated souring DS, the tier 1 supplier is fully respon-
sible for the onglomerate of parts supplied. Thus if both parts
fail, he has to pay damages DT1 + DSS to the OEM. If only one
part fails and does not ause the seond part to fail as well, only
damages Di have to be paid by the responsible supplier T1 or SS
respetively. In the ase of failure of part SS, T1 pays for the
damages to the OEM and reoups the same amount from SS.
• Under direted business DB, eah supplier is only made respon-
sible for failure of his part given that this is learly identiable.
The risk of both parts failing and of "trouble not found" is borne
by the OEM.
The suppliers' expeted prots under the two souring regimes then are
πDST1 = (pSS + pT1)− pSS − C(qT1)− qT1(1− qSS)(1− λ)DT1
−qSS(1− qT1)(1− λ)DSS + qSS(1− qT1)(1− λ)DSS
− (qT1(1− qSS)λ + qSS(1− qT1)λ + qT1qSS) (DSS + DT1)
πDBT1 = pT1 − C(qT1)− qT1(1− qSS)(1− λ)DT1
πDSSS = π
DB
SS = pSS − C(qSS)− qSS(1− qT1)(1− λ)DSS.(3.13)
We an immediately simply πDST1 to
πDST1 = pT1 − C(qT1)− qT1(1− qSS)(1− λ)DT1
− (qT1λ + qSSλ + qT1qSS(1− 2λ)) (DSS + DT1) .(3.14)
We furthermore require that produing higher quality, i.e. a lower qi, is







An example may be the funtion C(q) = (1− q)2.







We now analyze the inentives of both suppliers to set the quality qi. For
the sub-supplier, the prot funtion and thus quality qˆSS will be the same
under delegated souring and direted business. On the other hand, the tier
1 supplier's prots funtion diers with the souring regime. By taking the





− (1− qSS)(1− λ)DT1





− (1− qSS)(1− λ)DT1(3.16)
Under both souring regimes, a lower failure probability qT1 dereases the




Under delegated souring, πDST1 is more sensitive to failures. Hene the ex-
peted osts of failure are higher as long as λ+qSS(1−2λ) ≥ 0, whih indues
a higher eort for a lower qT1. This ondition holds for all qSS, λ ∈ [0, 1].
Not that it is independent of DT1 and DSS. Thus under delegated souring,
the tier 1 supplier has an inentive to produe higher quality than under
direted business. This eet ours beause the tier 1 supplier internalizes
the external eets between both parts whih are borne by the OEM under
direted business.
Note that the OEM ould also inentivize both the tier 1 and the sub-
supplier in any souring regime by setting a higher Di. In this simple model,
we assume though that the OEM an not demand a Di that is higher than
his own ost of failure (in the end market). This is a reasonable assumption
given that we an expet any failure osts to in the automotive industry to
be reasonably transparent to all parties, thus making an over-harging in Di
unrealisti. Besides, there are also strong legal barriers that do not allow
the OEM to harge more than the real osts D.34 In fat, the osts that the
OEM an demand bak from suppliers will be rather below his own osts if
one takes into aount the reputational eets that a failing vehile has on
the OEM, even if this failure was aused only by suppliers' parts.
We also do not model here a dierene inDi between the souring regimes,
whih would also shift inentives to provide quality. Given that the upper
bound on Di is given by the atual damage osts indued, generating dif-
ferenes in Di would only redue inentives to a lower than optimal level
34
As e.g. put forward in the douments on quality management and purhasing ondi-
tions of the VDA.
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from the point of view of the OEM. There may then be a trade-o between
lower damage payments, hene lower quality inentives, and otherwise higher
pries. But given the upper bound on Di and no problems of limited liability,
the OEM should always try to harge the supplier the upper bound of Di,
knowing that this will provide optimal quality inentives.
This simple model does not analyze the prie setting game but one an
easily add this, if desired. If the prie is unrelated to quality and osts of fail-
ure, the marginal eets remain unhanged to the preeding analysis. Thus






SS an be used to redistribute prots as desired.
In any bargaining situation where suppliers and the OEM share expeted
prots, pries exept for pDST1 will depend on quality. Thus suppliers' inen-
tives to produe higher quality inrease under direted business, while the
inentives for the tier 1 supplier under delegated souring remain unhanged,
given that he already fully internalizes all marginal eets. Nevertheless, as
long as suppliers do not earn all surplus from a transation, the spirit of the
analysis still holds.
If λ is ommon knowledge and the prodution is repeated, the prourer
an in the long term derive from failure rates the eort level hosen by eah
supplier. Then ontrats an be written suh that optimal eort is hosen
by suppliers in both regimes.
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3.8 Appendix: Tables
Tab. 3.7: Responses regarding the frequeny of direted business (DirectBus)
Response Observations N Perent
Never 80 37.4
Very rarely 44 20.6
Rarely 46 21.5
In a. half the ases 20 9.3
Frequently 19 8.9
Very frequently 5 2.3
Total 214 100
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Tab. 3.8: Cross-orrelations: Pearson Correlation, (Std.Dev.), N

















157 97 95 157
Renegot 0.105 -0.093 -0.125 .216
∗∗
(0.198) (0.38) (0.24) (0.009)
153 92 91 146
PrieRed 0.052 0.027 0.158 0.103
(0.536) (0.81) (0.152) (0.232)




(0) (0.106) (0.651) (0.067)






(0.002) (0.339) (0.002) (0.539)




(0.014) (0.244) (0.07) (0.495)
141 98 96 90
Testing -0.151 0 0.028 -0.183
(0.051) (0.997) (0.763) (0.051)




(0.024) (0.062) (0.369) (0.056)
154 118 116 108
RDsta -0.171 0.061 0.145 .276
†
(0.051) (0.557) (0.165) (0.005)
131 95 93 100
Compet -0.055 0.079 .244
∗
0.03
(0.505) (0.41) (0.011) (0.751)




(0.03) (0.439) (0.632) (0.72)
148 110 108 114
VolFlut 0.047 -0.117 0.121 0.276
∗∗
(0.575) (0.245) (0.235) (0.002)




(0.006) (0.779) (0.347) (0.398)
214 123 121 157
Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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138 130 185 185
DevShareOEM 0.08 -0.001 0.024 -.205
∗
(0.467) (0.991) (0.787) (0.021)






(0.308) (0.037) (0.016) (0.286)
109 101 149 149
QualResp -0.053 0.014 -0.075 0.015
(0.597) (0.89) (0.386) (0.859)




(0.295) (0.019) (0.606) (0.386)
97 92 118 118
Compet 0.072 0.014 -0.028 .171
∗
0.(453) (0.886) (0.748) (0.05)
111 100 133 133
Complex 0.129 0.066 -.255
∗∗
0.162
(0.176) (0.513) (0.003) (0.063)
111 100 133 133
VolFlut 0.157 -0.024 -0.002 0.014
0.089 (0.807) (0.982) (0.87)
(118) 108 133 133
DUMMYPREM -0.031 -0.06 0.095 -0.137
(0.702) (0.479) (0.2) (0.063)
153 142 185 185
Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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95 113 101 131
Compet 0.069 -0.009 -0.042 .546
∗∗
(0.477) (0.919) (0.652) (0)




(0.168) (0.001) (0.716) (0.223)
108 129 116 131
VolFlut 0.074 -0.022 -0.086 0.071
(0.475) (0.813) (0.368) (0.496)
96 119 112 94
DUMMYPREM 0.054 -0.101 -0.096 -0.149
(0.524) (0.194) (0.235) (0.089)
141 168 154 131
Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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VolFlut -0.006 0.049 1
(0.953) (0.609)
109 109 146
DUMMYPREM 0.012 -0.123 -0.056 1
(0.884) (0.137) (0.505)
148 148 146 214
Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Tab. 3.9: Responsibility for solving quality problems
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
QualResp_SST1 1.37 0.498 146
QualResp_SSOEM 2.73 1.015 126
QualResp_SSjoint 2.19 0.678 126
Answer 1 = Always the tier 1 supplier, 5 = Always the OEM
QualResp_SST1 = Tier 1 supplier selets sub-supplier
QualResp_SSOEM = OEM selets sub-supplier
QualResp_SSjoint = Both selet sub-supplier jointly
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Tab. 3.10: Importane of fators for direted business
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
1. Contrating and oordination osts 1.951 1.671
2. Transfer of ost information from suppliers 2.599 1.823
3. Protetion of OEMs' tehnial know-how 2.105 1.61
4. OEMs' development eorts 1.87 1.496
5. Purhase prie of the entire system/module 2.784 1.936
6. Purhase prie of the part supplied by the sub-supplier 2.772 1.839
7. Risk minimisation with respet to quality 2.556 1.672
8. Risk minimisation with respet to development suess 2.284 1.621
9. Transfer of exogenous risks 1.852 1.529
10. Degree of innovativeness of the sub-supplier part 2.16 1.595
11. Degree of innovativeness of the tier 1 part 2.049 1.544
12. Importane of the sub-supplier part in the vehile 2.525 1.706
13. Importane of the tier 1 part in the vehile 2.358 1.678
14. Enforement of the OEMs' bargaining power 2.401 1.757
15. Standardisation or platform strategy 2.309 1.673
16. Multiple souring 2.056 1.581
17. Trust in the sub-supplier 2.278 1.581
18. Trust in the tier 1 supplier 2.327 1.664
19. Long-term ooperation with the sub-supplier 2.309 1.624
20. Long-term ooperation with the tier 1 supplier 2.302 1.619
N 162
Answer 0 = Not relevant, 1− 5 = Very low to very high importane
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Tab. 3.11: Importane of fators for direted business: Premium OEMs
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
1. Contrating and oordination osts 2.095 1.676
2. Transfer of ost information from suppliers 2.845 1.76
3. Protetion of OEMs' tehnial know-how 2.464 1.579
4. OEMs' development eorts 2.036 1.452
5. Purhase prie of the entire system/module 3.119 1.846
6. Purhase prie of the part supplied by the sub-supplier 3.048 1.783
7. Risk minimisation with respet to quality 2.869 1.581
8. Risk minimisation with respet to development suess 2.5 1.533
9. Transfer of exogenous risks 1.976 1.472
10. Degree of innovativeness of the sub-supplier part 2.393 1.529
11. Degree of innovativeness of the tier 1 part 2.238 1.445
12. Importane of the sub-supplier part in the vehile 2.738 1.651
13. Importane of the tier 1 part in the vehile 2.583 1.6
14. Enforement of the OEMs' bargaining power 2.738 1.715
15. Standardisation or platform strategy 2.512 1.617
16. Multiple souring 2.321 1.554
17. Trust in the sub-supplier 2.524 1.501
18. Trust in the tier 1 supplier 2.488 1.579
19. Long-term ooperation with the sub-supplier 2.571 1.515
20. Long-term ooperation with the tier 1 supplier 2.571 1.499
N 84
Answer 0 = Not relevant, 1− 5 = Very low to very high importane
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Tab. 3.12: Importane of fators for direted business: Volume OEMs
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
1. Contrating and oordination osts 1.815 1.68
2. Transfer of ost information from suppliers 2.352 1.881
3. Protetion of OEMs' tehnial know-how 1.666 1.541
4. OEMs' development eorts 1.651 1.52
5. Purhase prie of the entire system/module 2.45 1.993
6. Purhase prie of the part supplied by the sub-supplier 2.481 1.883
7. Risk minimisation with respet to quality 2.203 1.712
8. Risk minimisation with respet to development suess 2.045 1.696
9. Transfer of exogenous risks 1.714 1.592
10. Degree of innovativeness of the sub-supplier part 1.894 1.655
11. Degree of innovativeness of the tier 1 part 1.818 1.644
12. Importane of the sub-supplier part in the vehile 2.318 1.755
13. Importane of the tier 1 part in the vehile 2.093 1.731
14. Enforement of the OEMs' bargaining power 1.993 1.718
15. Standardisation or platform strategy 2.065 1.718
16. Multiple souring 1.737 1.579
17. Trust in the sub-supplier 2.018 1.659
18. Trust in the tier 1 supplier 2.168 1.78
19. Long-term ooperation with the sub-supplier 2.05 1.73
20. Long-term ooperation with the tier 1 supplier 2.025 1.723
N 78
Answer 0 = Not relevant, 1− 5 = Very low to very high importane
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Tab. 3.13: Instrumental variable regression: regression for QualProb as instrument













Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Tab. 3.14: Instrumental variable regression: regression for DevShareOEM as in-
strument

















Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Tab. 3.15: Instrumental variable regression: regression for CostTransp as instru-
ment

















Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
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Tab. 3.16: Linear regression: Direted business (DirectBus) as dependent vari-
able, independent variables inluding the sharing of development be-
tween the tier 1 and the sub-supplier


















Signiane levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
4. THE EFFECT OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS ON




Let us think of a world with international trade restrited by taris. What
are the impliations when a subset of ountries signs a free trade agreement
(FTA)? In partiular, what happens to the welfare of the rest of the world?
The standard answer to this question is explained through the innoent
bystander problem (Krugman, 1991): the ountries left out of an FTA suer
in welfare. The redution in welfare is primarily due to trade diversion:
joining ountries trade more with eah other beause of lower after-tari
pries, even though there is a potentially more eient produer in the rest
of the world. Some literature on the innoent bystander problem is reviewed
in the next setion.
In ontrast, we show that under some onditions, an FTA between a sub-
set of ountries an also benet the non-partiipating ountries. To present
this result, we employ a model of international trade with horizontally dif-
ferentiated produts. For dierent parameters within the same model, we
also re-establish the innoent bystander result. Thus, we an highlight the
onditions under whih the traditional result holds or breaks down.
The intuition behind our results is simple. The FTA between two oun-
tries redues trade barriers and thus inreases ompetition between their
rms. In our model, the resulting prie redution in two ountries leads
to a global redution in pries. Surplus then is redistributed from rms to
onsumers, whih is a standard result. In addition, however, inreased om-
petition also leads to a more equal priing pattern aross ountries, whih
redues the average disutility ost borne by onsumers for onsuming a prod-
ut mix not in line with their (non-prie) preferenes. This is a pure global
welfare reation. For a third, non-FTA ountry, the redution of its rms'
prots due to inreased ompetition re-establishes the trade diversion eet
in the literature. However, if that ountry's onsumer population is large,
the ountry's onsumer surplus addition will be larger than its rms' losses
and thus it will benet from the FTA.
A key feature of our model is the non-existene of perfet prie-disrimi-
nation aross ountries. Eah of our rms has a home ountry but sells its
goods globally. Prie-disrimination is onstrained in our model by potential
ross-border arbitrage of onsumers. When a rm raises or lowers its pries
in one ountry, its pries in another ountry will then hange equally. Our
ndings do not neessarily require that pries of a rm are equal everywhere,
but we will assume this for simpliity reasons, without loss of generality. That
prie movements between ountries are orrelated and there is no perfet prie
disrimination is supported by several ndings (see, e.g., Knetter, 1993).
In the next setion, we review the relevant literature and highlight our
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dierenes and similarities. In Setion 4.3, we introdue a two-ountry model
to familiarise the reader with the workings of the model, before we move on
to the welfare analysis in a multi-ountry ase. Setion 4.4 onludes.
4.2 Literature
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The rst strand of literature
involves the innoent bystander problem (Krugman, 1991), whih, as the
name suggests, disusses adverse eets for third ountries left out of an
FTA between other ountries. To the best of our knowledge, authors in this
literature onur with this assessment. In ontrast, we highlight onditions
under whih the ountry that does not partiipate in an FTA is happy to be
an innoent bystander.
Of ourse, it has to be noted that global barrier-free trade is welfare-
maximising in our model. However, the third ountry will not objet to an
FTA between others, beause it is a welfare improvement relative to the ase
of all-around protetion, not only for the FTA-ountries but even for that
third non-partiipating ountry.
The examples of an innoent bystander problem in literature are abun-
dant: Kose and Riezman (1997, 1999) ompute a general equilibrium model
with asymmetri ountries and examine two ases: Case 1, when a small
ountry is left out of the FTA made up of two large ountries, and Case
2, when one large ountry is left out of the FTA made up of the remaining
large and small ountries (Kose and Riezman, 1999). They nd, among other
results, that in Case 1, the small innoent bystander suers a lot, and in pro-
portion to its relative smallness. Also in Case 2, the third large ountry loses
from the FTA beause of a deterioration in its terms of trade.
Bond, Riezman, and Syropoulos (2004) show how the third ountry an
win from the reation of an FTA between two other ountries, through the
strategi inentives of the FTA members to hange their outside tari poliy
after the reation of the FTA (ited in Andriamananjara, 2004). When suh
eets are not present, the third ountry typially loses; in ontrast, we nd
onditions where the third ountry (and the world, in total) benets without
any strategi re-adjustment of taris by any ountry.
Andriamananjara (2004) shows that the ountries left out of the FTA
have an inentive to retaliate with their own trading blo or with inreased
protetion.
Winters and Chang (2000) and Chang and Winters (2002) disuss what
happens to the non-members' rms when several ountries enter into an FTA
and drop the taris against members. The non-member ountries' exporters
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to the member ountries fae the ompetition from the member ountries'
rms. Thus, as the member taris go down, the member ountries' rms
beome more ompetitive, whih puts pressure onto the non-member rms
to lower their pries. Like in the present paper, this is an eet on the pries
of imports that results purely from ompetition: Winters and Chang (2000)
show this empirially for the ase of Spain and EC, and, respetively, Chang
and Winters (2002) for the ase of MERCOSUR.
Ornelas (2007) provides a partial equilibrium model with dierentiated
goods, with redistributional eets of an FTA: that is, the FTA redistributes
the welfare from third ountries to the member ountries, even if the ountries
are small ompared to the rest of the world (but large enough to inuene
their own import pries). In our model, too, member ountries an appro-
priate a part of non-member welfare, but this is not the only eet.
The seond strand of literature introdues Hotelling line into the interna-
tional trade framework, either as a spatial eonomy with ountries oupying
dierent segments of the Hotelling line, or as dierentiated markets in dif-
ferent ountries, onneted via trade (think of two parallel Hotelling lines as
two ountries, see Shmitt, 1990, 1993, 1995), and asks a question of optimal
trade poliy.
When a spatial eonomy is involved, it is found that under some on-
ditions the optimal tari rate is stritly positive: if the ompanies are able
to reloate, a tari may indue a ompany to loate away from the bor-
der, thus leading to lower average transportation osts inside a ountry, and
hene lower delivered pries to the onsumers (Herander, 1997; Porter, 1984).
In our framework, free trade is always optimal for the world as a whole. A
FTA between a subset of ountries is welfare-improving ompared to fully re-
strited trade, but the distribution of the generated surplus between member
and non-member ountries depends espeially on their respetive size.
Benson and Hartigan (1983) propose a spatial model with a set-up similar
to ours. However, they disuss only the ase of two ountries, therefore the
eet of a tari on third ountries is not disussed. The authors fous on
the redistributional eets of a tari on onsumer surplus. They nd that
if a domesti rm is proteted by a tari on imported goods, it may under
some onditions still lower its prie relative to the situation without the
tari. Yet this results requires spei assumptions on rms' behaviour and
ertain speiations of the demand funtion of onsumers. In our model,
we onentrate on the eet of a tari on a third ountry. In addition, we
avoid avoid spei assumptions on rms' behaviour or onsumer demand,
and therefore a tari unambiguously inreases the prie of the proteted rm
in our model.
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4.3 The model
To study the eet of an FTA on the welfare of the non-member ountries, we
propose a partial equilibrium three-ountry model of trade in dierentiated
goods, in the Hotelling style. Two ountries will form an FTA, and we will
fous on the welfare of the non-FTA ountry. No eets are lost with the
restrition to only three ountries.
Our model an represent a world of onneted spatial line eonomies,
where the ends of the line stand for address-of-sale of otherwise idential
goods, and onsumers live along these lines at dierent distanes from the
points-of-sale. Thus, eah line represents the area between the eonomi
entres of two of the three ountries, with the border somewhere on that
line.
On the other hand, the model also onforms with a tastes interpretation,
in whih the ends of the line represent (national) harateristis of the goods,
and onsumers are distinguished by how muh they prefer one ountry's good
over another's at given pries. As in the spatial interpretation, there is a
border between eah pair of ountries, whih mainly serves to distinguish
ountries by their size. We prefer this seond, tastes approah.
Countries in our model are asymmetri in the size of their population. In
the geographi interpretation, this implies that at given population density,
onsumers will be more dispersed in the large than in the small ountry. In
the tastes interpretation, this means that the preferenes in the large oun-
try are more dispersed. In fat, there is weak evidene that large ountries
are in fat more diverse (see Rose, 2006). It would also be possible to disen-
tangle the number of onsumers and their dispersion with no gain of insight
but at a ost of losing simpliity.
1
We onsider a partial equilibrium analysis of one industry, similar to Or-
nelas (2007).
2
Our industry is small in the sense that the pries in this
industry do not aet pries (and thus marginal deisions) in any other in-
dustry or market (inluding fator markets).
Within this industry, rms ompete globally in dierentiated produts.
1
Note that as disussed before, models with similar setups as ours have been used
before in the international trade ontext, e.g., (Benson and Hartigan, 1983; Herander,
1997; Porter, 1984). Therefore we onsider this to be a realisti setup.
2
The model an be losed by an introdution of a ompetitively produed and traded
numeraire good, whih serves to balane the trade and x labour inome, but this is not
our fous. None of our main results would hange. In partiular, the results of reation of
onsumer surplus though a more symmetri onsumption of the dierentiated good in an
asymmetri-ountry world would still hold. The partial equilibrium nature of our model
lets us onentrate on the imperfet ompetition in our hosen industry, and the assoiated
eets.
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For our results, it sues that the rms' prie setting in various ountries
is inter-dependent: i.e., when a rm lowers its prie in one ountry, its prie
in another ountry must also derease, and vie versa. Firms may still set
dierent pries between ountries, but we abstrat from this for simpliity of
the model exposition and with no loss of generality.
To motivate parallel prie hanges of a rm aross ountries, arbitrage
through parallel imports as disussed e.g. by Malueg and Shwartz (1994)
is an immediate argument. Taris or other barriers-to-trade will limit ar-
bitrage and thus prie disrimination may our. However, arbitrage will
still ensure that prie hanges through exogenous shoks go into the same
diretion everywhere.
Two examples shall be disussed in more detail: the automotive and the
textile market. In the European automotive market, international prie dis-
rimination has been shown to exist e.g. by Ginsburgh (1994) over a long
period of time.
3
By virtue of exemption from omplying with Artile 85 of
the European Common Market Treaty, as well as purely illegal ativities,
the European automotive industry has set up many and varying barriers to
ross-border trade in ars. However, even given widespread ross-border prie
disrimination, the prie movements over time are still orrelated. Table 4.1
at the end of the paper shows ross-market prie orrelations for seleted ar
models aross several geographi markets during 19701999. Within onti-
nental Europe, the prie orrelations are above 90 perent. The orrelations
between the ontinental and the UK markets are never below 77, and often
above 90 perent.
4
The relatively low UK-related orrelation might be best
explained by dierenes in the driver's wheel position.
The textile market is subjet to tari negotiations in and with Europe,
due to pereived threat of heap Chinese and Indian textile produts. This
market would be prime for prie disrimination. However, textiles are often
traded at several textile expositions, where the buyers ome from all over the
world to buy entrally, at one prie. An example is the Texworld Fabris fair
in Paris, organised by Messe Frankfurt.
Governments set taris at the border.
5
We assume that taris apply
equally in both diretions: with ountries asymmetri in size, this assump-
3
The artile by Ginsburgh (1994) has also been revised and in its latest version in 1997
still onurs with this onlusion.
4
The European Commission has been atively trying to redue prie disrimination in
reent years. If a onvergene of pries has in fat ourred, suh a onvergene will have
had a negative eet on the stated orrelations, as pries then move in opposite diretions.
Thus the true underlying orrelation would be even higher.
5
Taris are either paid by rms or onsumers on a purhase: these settings are equiv-
alent, in our model.
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tion is not binding, for trade only happens in one diretion in our industry.
We onentrate on the ase of asymmetri ountries, as it provides the most
interesting insights; our model is Riardian in nature, suh that symmetri
ountries do not tradethe disussion of this ase is relegated to the Ap-
pendix 4.5. Firms pay the taris when exporting into a foreign ountry.
Furthermore for the rms, we assume zero marginal ost of prodution. As
we model market power within our industry, we assume one rm in eah
ountry.
Next, we present the details of the model and establish results in a setting
with two asymmetri ountries to familiarise the reader with the workings of
the model, before analysing the welfare impliations of tari movements in
a three-ountry setting in Setion 4.3.2.
We attempt to expliitly state and disuss every ritial assumption as
we go on.
4.3.1 Two asymmetri ountries
In the ase of two ountries, our model is a version of a Hotelling (1929)
model. There are two produts, i and j, sold in the global market, whih is
represented by a line of length s normalized to unity. The ends of this line
onstitute the point of sale of these two produts. Consumers are distributed
along this line from 0 to 1 with onstant density f(x) = 1 and thus have a
total mass of one (so the CDF F (1) = 1). Somewhere on the line is a border
B, suh that the segment [0, B) represents onsumers of one ountry, and
the segment (B, 1] the onsumers of the other ountry.
The loation x of a onsumer on the line depits that onsumer's (non-
prie) preferenes over the produts. The further away x is from the point
of sale at 0 or 1, the lower the utility of onsuming the respetive prod-
ut. This an be interpreted either geographially suh that onsumers inur
travel osts when purhasing at 0 or 1, or as tastes where distane relates to
disutility beause produt harateristis do not fully math the preferenes.
As an example for the tastes interpretation, take the ar market in Germany
and Frane: the point of sale in Frane would then orrespond to Frenh-
ness and the onsumers would be distinguished by how muh they prefer,
all else equal, a Frenh ar over a German one or vie versa.
6
Consumers are utility maximisers and buy one or zero units of a good
of at most one of the ountries present. Consumers loser to the border
have a stronger preferene for buying a foreign produt, at given pries, than
6
The taste dispersion an also orrespond to geography. Casual observation in Germany
shows that Saarland has many more Frenh ars than Bavaria. Indeed, the oial polie
ars in Saarland are Peugeot, while in Bavaria they are BMW or Audi.
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their fellow itizens from the entre of the ountry. Consumers at 1/2 are
indierent between buying domesti or foreign good, at equal pries. An













(b) Trade with tari
Fig. 4.1: Free trade and tari with two asymmetri ountries
A onsumer loated at x with 0 ≤ x ≤ B has an additive separable utility
from onsuming his domesti good i or the foreign good j suh that:
(4.1) ux(pi) = a− pi − r · |x− 0| ,
(4.2) ux(pj) = a− pj − t− r · |1− x| ,
The parameter a is the maximal utility from onsumption, pi and pj are
ompany i's and respetively j's pries, t is the tari that the onsumer
has to pay when purhasing the foreign produt and r is the transportation
osts or redution in utility beause the onsumed produt is away from the
individual preferenes.
7
The above utility funtion refers to a onsumer x living in ountry i,
i.e. with 0 ≤ x ≤ B. The utility for a onsumer x in ountry j, i.e., with
B ≤ x ≤ 1, is symmetri in the sense that a onsumption from i osts
an additional t while onsuming the domesti produt j only osts pj plus
r · (1− x).
The ountries presented are asymmetri only due to their relative popu-
lation sizes. If the border between ountries i and j lies loser to where the
7
Assuming another well-used form of the transportation ost funtionthe quadrati
transportation ostswill make distane even more important and should strengthen the
results presented in this paper.
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good j is positioned, i is said to be large ompared to j. Then i has more
onsumers and more dispersed preferenes. At equal pries, the average on-
sumer of ountry i prefers good i, while the reverse holds for ountry j. This
is true irrespetive of the size of the ountry.
We assume that at zero pries and a tari t = 0, every onsumer would
have a positive utility from buying one of the produts.
8
That is, we restrit
our exogenous parameters to those values that lead to an eetive equilibrium
between both ountries at t = 0. This in partiular requires a − 3
2
r · 1 ≥ 0,
or: a ≥ 3
2
r. This is the same as saying that the market is overed.9
In eah ountry, there is one prot-maximising rm. Thus there will be
one rm i and one rm j, selling their produts at 0 and 1 respetively. Firms
have zero marginal ost and set pries to maximise prot. If the market is
overed, the quantities demanded at a given prie are then determined by
the distane to the onsumer xˆ who is indierent between their and their
rival's produts. The indierent onsumer an be found at the intersetion
of the onsumer utility urves in Fig.4.1, whih due to the tari inlude
disontinuities at the border. The rms' prot funtions are then as follows:
πi = xˆ(pi, pj) · pi
πj = (1− xˆ(pi, pj)) · pj .(4.3)
We now solve this simple model with two ountries for the equilibria with
and without taris. We set the border at
1
2
< B < 1, suh that i is a large
and j a small ountry.
Without a tari and with equal pries, onsumers in ountry i with 1
2
<
x ≤ B will purhase the foreign produt from ountry j. The onsumer in
ountry i who is indierent between the domesti and the foreign good is at
xˆ = 1
2
, suh that there are imports of size M = B − xˆ from ountry j into
ountry i.10 This is depited in Fig.4.1(a).
Let us now introdue a tari tas in Fig.4.1(b):
Lemma 1. Assume the market is overed (a ≥ 3
2
r). If the ountries are
suiently asymmetri and the tari t is suiently low, there exists an
equilibrium with imports from the small into the large ountry.
Proof. Assume that there are imports from j into i even under the tari suh
that the indierent onsumer lies at xˆ < B. We then solve for the equilibrium
pries:
8
The utility from onsuming a hypothetial outside good is normalized to 0.
9
For a detailed disussion of what happens if the market is not overed, and the resulting
equilibria, please refer to Ivanov and Müller (2006).
10
Pries will be symmetri at pi = pj = r. This is the standard Hotelling result.
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πi = xˆ · pi = ( 1
2r
(pj − pi + t) + 1
2
) · pi
πj = (1− xˆ) · pj = ( 1
2r


















The pries p∗i and p
∗
j onstitute an equilibrium under the following on-
ditions. The indierent onsumer must lie in ountry i and the indierent
onsumer must derive positive utility from onsuming either produt:
(4.5) xˆ < B ⇔ t < r · (6B − 3).
(4.6) Ux=xˆ(pj − t) = a− pj − t− r(1− xˆ) > 0 ⇔ t < 2a− 3r.
Given B > 1
2
and a > 3
2
r, there is always a positive t that fullls both
onditions 4.5 and 4.6.
At this stage, the diretion of trade deserves to be ommented in more
detail. Trade in our model ows from the small into the large, more diverse
ountry. Our rms are ompletely idential. Therefore, having a small do-
mesti onsumer base to satisfy is atually a omparative advantage in the
sense that it pushes a rm to export. On the other hand, a rm with a large
domesti market is ontent with its own domesti onsumers and does not
want to export. In the absene of eonomies of sale, the small ountryto
large ountry trade is the natural (partial) equilibrium outome.
It would be possible to introdue eonomies of sale, whih would benet
the rm in the larger ountry, suh that it then behaves bigger on the global
sale, exporting to smaller ountries. This would move away from the fous
of this paper and oneal the main drivers behind our results, but should
not remove them. In either ase, onsidering eonomies of sale would be an
interesting extension to our model, but for the time being, we abstrat from
this onsideration.
In what follows, we will fous on equilibria that always exhibit trade under
a speied tari equal to or larger than zero. That is, we look at a world
with asymmetri ountries, a > 3
2
r and low enough taris. The motivation
is simple. If we ompared a no-trade equilibrium under a tari with a trade
equilibrium under an FTA, the FTA eets would be stronger. Instead, we
want to ompare apples to apples.
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Next, we disuss the welfare impliations of the tari. Welfare of eah
ountry is measured by the sum of onsumer surplus CS, produer prots π
and, where appliable, a tari revenue. In the situation of ountries i and j
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Note that the tari proeeds enter the welfare of ountries but are re-
distributed to neither onsumers nor rms. We an immediately derive the
following:
Lemma 2. Assume the market is overed (a ≥ 3
2
r). With a tari and
asymmetri ountries, equilibrium pries will be unequal. Equal pries and,
thus, highest welfare an be ahieved only under free trade: starting with a
tari equilibrium, welfare stritly inreases the loser the ountries get to the
free trade situation.
Lemma 2 is a standard result in Hotelling-style models. However, it is
entral to understand welfare eets in these models. Therefore, instead of
a proof, we provide a detailed disussion of the Lemma. Let us look at the
ase of two asymmetri ountries: the intuition is the same with more than
two ountries.
First, lemma 1 shows that with a tari and asymmetri ountries, equi-
librium pries will be unequal. Let us now motivate why overall welfare is
maximized with equal priing and no tari.
To understand the welfare eets of a tari, it sues to ompare two
ases as depited in Fig.4.2: Equal pries without a tari and the introdu-
tion of a tari t, holding pries xed. The seond ase does not onstitute
an equilibrium, as argued in lemma 1. Instead, pries will be unequal in
equilibrium. We ignore this aspet in Fig.4.2 for the purpose of simpliity
but will get bak to it later on.
In Fig.4.2, the onsumer surplus given produer pries pi = pj is the
total area under the onsumer utility urves, U(pi) and U(pj). The produer
surplus is given by the dotted retangle at the top between a, U(pi) and
U(pj), and inluding the area (A). The parts of these areas to the left of the
border B belong to ountry i, and to the right of B, to ountry j.
Now, imagine for a moment that a tari t is introdued and pries pi = pj
stay onstant. Then, the eetive prie that onsumers in ountry i pay for
produts imported from j inreases to pj + t. Thus, imports into i derease
from M to Mˆ (the indierent onsumer moves from 1
2
to xˆ).












Fig. 4.2: Welfare hange from a prie inrease by rm j
The welfare hanges in the following way: Country i now has a tari
revenue (TR) (light grey parallelogram) on the remaining imports from j.
This tari revenue is paid by those onsumers in i that remain purhasing
produt j. Thus, (TR) is a pure redistribution of welfare from onsumers to
the government in ountry i. In addition, rm i appropriates surplus from
rm j beause of dereased imports, depited by the grey retangle (A). All
the other surpluses belong to the same ators also after introduing t, exept
for the white triangle (C).
This triangle (C) is a pure dead-weight loss, as onsumers lying between
1/2 and xˆ now purhase their less preferred good (from rm i) over their
more preferred one (from rm j). In fat, suh a dead-weight loss will always
our one the indierent onsumer xˆ lies away from 1
2
. The dead-weight
loss (C) ould only be avoided when the eetive prie of rm j in ountry
i was equal to the prie of rm i, i.e., pj + t = pi. As lemma 1 shows, this
does not onstitute an equilibrium beause p∗j + t = r +
2
3
t 6= r + 1
3
t = p∗i ,












. The welfare maximizing equilibrium an result
only from free trade, when pries are equal: with tari t > 0, an asymmetri
equilibrium neessarily obtains.
Note that in Fig.4.2, we ompared equal pries without a tari and the
introdution of a tari t, holding pries xed. From lemma 1 instead we
114 Chapter 4. Free Trade Agreements
know that under the tari, rms will adjust their pries ompared to the
pre-tari situation. Thus the eet of the tari is ompensated by priing
to some degree, but not ompletely. As lemma 1 shows, imports will still
derease relative to the non-tari situation and the basi intuition of Fig.4.2
holds.
Under a free trade agreement between these two ountries, pries are
pi = pj = r and therefore, the overall world welfare is maximised and equal
to
W a = a− 1
4
r.
On the other hand, with a tari t, the (asymmetri prie) equilibrium of
lemma 1 results in the overall welfare of







where W t is stritly dereasing in t.
The eet of a tari on the welfare of the importing ountry is determined
by the dead-weight loss in its onsumer surplus versus the inreased domesti
rm's prot due to the appropriation of surplus from the foreign rm. De-
pending on the size of these hanges, ountry i an gain or lose overall. For
the exporting ountry, we know that welfare will be lower under the tari as
the prie of its produts as well as the size of exports derease.
4.3.2 Three asymmetri ountries
Let us expand the analysis to three ountries i, j, as well as k, and assume
that onsumers of these ountries are arranged along the sides of a triangle
as depited in Fig.4.3. The orners of the triangle represent the points of
sale
11
of (domesti) produts, just as in the ase of two ountries. Eah side
of the triangle is assumed to have length and onsumer mass of one. There









To understand the welfare analysis for individual ountries, it is important
to keep in mind that any move to a more equal priing pattern, moving the




We start with the restrited trade situation between all pairs of ountries,




We now dene without loss of generality that in the market between ountries i and
j, i is the origin and the position of j is at 1. In the market between ountries i and k, i
is the origin and the position of k is at 1. In the market between ountries j and k, j is
the origin and the position of k is at 1.







Fig. 4.3: One large and two small ountries
Proposition 1. Let there be two small and one large ountry with symmetri
taris; let the market be overed (a ≥ 3
2
r). Then, as long as taris t are
low enough, there are two possible equilibria with imports M into the large
ountry from the two small ountries. With a low valuation a of the good by






, a high prie equilibrium is obtained where rms in





r, there is a low prie equilibrium.




, the prie level in both ountries will be the same and there will
thus be no trade aross the border Bjk.
One possible equilibrium inludes the prie phj = p
h
k = a − 12r (see
Fig.4.4(a)). Under these pries, all onsumers in ountries j and k on-
sume and the onsumer at the border Bjk reeives zero utility (i.e., he is
just indierent between buying any of the two losest goods or not buying
at all). This prie would also obtain if there were no tari but the rms j
and k olludedwe all this high prie equilibrium. We get the following
outome:
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phj = p
h































































where W hi is the welfare of ountry i, and M
h
are the imports into i from
ountry j and k. Note that beause j and k are symmetri, we express Mh
only as dependent on B = Bij = Bik.
This equilibrium needs to be stable against deviating strategies by a single
player. This requires spei onditions on a, r, and t. The details an be
found in the Appendix 4.6.1, but for our disussion it sues to note that,
in partiular, t needs to be suiently small and a an not be too high. It
an be shown that
















there exists a suiently low t suh that the ollusive equilibrium is obtained.
Another possible equilibrium is when ompanies j and k harge lower-
than-ollusive pries due to ompetition with i in the foreign market. This





















































Again, for the existene of this equilibrium, onditions on a, r, and t
must hold, and the rms' individual rationality onditions have to rule out













i.e., that the ountries are suiently asymmetri in size and onsumer val-
uation of the good is high enough. The detailed onditions an be found in
the Appendix 4.6.2.
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The attrativeness of one equilibrium over the other depends on the sur-
plus that an be extrated from domesti onsumers, determined by a, and
the export potential into i, whih depends on the border B = Bij = Bik. If
a is large, the FTA ountries' rms may forgo export revenue and extrat as
muh surplus as possible from their domesti onsumers. Otherwise, the ex-
port revenue is more attrative than the domesti revenue. When disussing
the two equilibria, it has to be kept in mind that we only analyze situations
with trade. For a partiularly high a, surplus extration from domesti us-
tomers will be more attrative than exporting and a no-trade equilibrium
may then be obtained. We do not onsider this ase beause we want to
ompare equilibria with trade.
13
The detailed onditions for the attrative-
ness of one equilibrium over the other are relegated to the end of Appendix
4.6.2.
It is possible to show that the two equilibria in Proposition 1 are the
only two pure-strategy equilibria possible under given onditions, using the
arguments of the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix 4.5.
Next, we abolish the tari tjk between ountries j and k through the
formation of an FTA, while the taris tij = tik = t are upheld. We show its
impliations for the world welfare through the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let there be two small and one large ountry with symmetri
taris; let the market be overed (a ≥ 3
2
r). When the small ountries j
and k set up an FTA, the overall world welfare inreases. If the tari t is
low enough and the third, non-partiipating, ountry i is large enough, that
ountry's welfare also inreases.





k = r − 15t










































Pries set by rms j and k are learly lower than before the FTA, due to
stronger ompetition with eah other.
15
Note that, due to the abolition of
13
Otherwise we would be omparing apples with oranges. Our results omparing to
the situation with the FTA would be stronger, but inadequate.
14
Idential eets apply respetively to the omparison between the FTA equilibrium
and a pre-FTA ompetitive equilibrium and are depited in Fig.4.6 in the Appendix 4.6.3.
15
Note also that pries are below the ompetitive pries pj = pk = r in two ountries.
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the tari between them, rms j and k ompete more erely with eah other,
but there will still be no trade between these ountries due to their symmetry.
Beause the rms annot prie disriminate internationally, ompetition is
arried over into ountry i where rm i lowers its prie in its own market.
The FTA also leads to more imports from the small ountries j and k into i.
Given the market is overed (a > 3
2








And for a small t, also M l < Ma.16
Under onditions (4.9) and (4.11) that ensure ollusive and ompetitive
equilibria, respetively, also the FTA equilibrium exists. This is due to the
fat that under the FTA, there are more imports and the indierent on-
sumer in i lies further away from the border than before. The details of the
alulations of the FTA equilibrium are presented in the Appendix 4.6.3.
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Fig. 4.4: Pre-FTA and post-FTA equilibria with one large and two small ountries
With the post-FTA equilibrium in mind, we now proeed to the welfare
disussion. We have shown that the indierent j/k onsumer stays at 1
2
16
A small t is any t < 5r. As disussed in Appendix.4.6.2, the ompetitive equilibrium
also requires t < 2r suh that the the former ondition is always fullled.
4.3. The model 119
and the i/j and i/k onsumers move loser to the middle of their respetive
markets: thus, as was disussed at the end of Setion 4.3.1, we immediately
know that the total world welfare post-FTA is higher than before the FTA.
We now show under whih onditions the non-FTA ountry i gains, ompared
to the ollusive pre-FTA equilibrium:






whih, together with t > 0, implies:
0 < t <
5
14








A similar ondition when omparing with the ompetitive pre-FTA equi-
librium is then:






whih with t > 0 implies:
0 < t < 40Br − 35r and thus B > 7
8
.(4.14)
The welfare eet of the FTA on ountry i is determined by three fators:
First, higher imports into i inrease onsumer welfare beause the equilibrium
moves loser to the situation with free trade. The same eet has also been
disussed in the ase of two ountries in Setion 4.3.1. Seond, higher imports
inrease the tari revenue of ountry i. And third, higher imports and lower
pries redue the prots of rm i. The sum of these ountervailing eets
determines the net welfare eet on ountry i.
The sum of the eets is positive for a large enough border B beause a
large border ensures that a high number of onsumers in ountry i benet
from the downward movement in pries. On the other hand, the loss of rm
i does not depend on the border but on the indierent onsumer before and
after the FTA.
We have just shown how an FTA an benet a third ountry, but it still
remains to hek the inentive for ountries j and k to onlude an FTA
agreement in the rst plae. Beause all welfare eets of the FTA within
ountries j and k are purely redistributional, we onentrate on the potential
welfare gain generated through inreased exports from j and k into i. It thus
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sues to ompare rm j's (alternatively, k's) overall revenues from exports
before and after the FTA:
Maj · paj > Mhj · phj ,




















for the ollusive pre-FTA equilibrium, and separately for the ompetitive
pre-FTA equilibrium:
Maj · paj > M lj · plj
⇔ 5
7
(12Br − 11r) < t < 5r.(4.16)
There is a range of parameters (a,B, t) with t > 0 that simultaneously
satisfy onditions (4.13) and (4.15) (or (4.14) and (4.16), with the ompet-
itive pre-FTA equilibrium). In the ase of (4.13) and (4.15) this holds for






(and in the ase of (4.14) and (4.16) for B > 7
8
). For
these parameters, not only do ountries j and k gain from forming an FTA
agreement with eah other, but also the innoent bystander i gains in wel-
fare, beause its onsumers benet from the global ompetition of j's and k's
rms.
4.4 Conlusion
We have presented a partial equilibrium model of international trade, in
whih an exogenous redution in the barriers-to-trade may have welfare im-
pliations for third, as well as for diretly aeted ountries. When applied
to the establishment of an FTA, by treating the barriers-to-trade as tar-
is, we show the following: On the one hand, under some parameters, the
non-partiipating ountry loses in welfare, a situation widely known as the
innoent bystander problem. On the other hand, there are situations under
whih all ountries in our model world, inluding the non-member, may gain
in welfare after setting up an FTA between a subset of ountries.
The intuition behind our result is simple. Through the FTA, rms in
the member ountries ompete more erely with eah other and lower their
pries. Competition is arried over into the third ountry. This moves the
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equilibrium outome loser to the free trade situation. Sine the free trade
situation is welfare-maximising, this inreases the world welfare.
For the non-partiipating ountry, in a ertain parameter range, the loss
in prot of its rms is outweighed by the gain in its onsumer surplus plus
the tari revenue from imports, suh that even the non-partiipating ountry
an gain from an FTA between other ountries.
There are potentially many historial settings in whih the model an
be applied. Setting up of Benelux Customs Union in 1948 may have lead
to stronger ompetitive behaviour of the Benelux ompanies abroad. New
EU members typially have had an FTA agreement with the EU prior to
joining, but may have been fored to aept a redution of barriers to other
new members, whih in turn may have lead to stronger ompetition of their
ompanies in the old EU, even though nothing has hanged on those borders.
Taking the model in the other diretion, the break-up of former Yugoslavia
and the USSR may have lead to their ompanies behaving in a less ompet-
itive fashion elsewhere in the world. The break-up of these ountries an
be onsidered as turning from an FTA to a protetive world, with an intro-
dution of taris and other barriers-to-trade between former trade partners.
Within our model, this would lead to a less aggressive behaviour (i.e., higher
pries) by the rms of the ex-member ountries.
To sum up, we have attempted to highlight some fators, under whih an
FTA between a subset of ountries may be welfare-improving for all ountries,
and thus may be viewed as a stepping-stone to the ompletely free-trade
world.
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4.5 Appendix: Equilibrium under two symmetri ountries
Assume that there are two ountries i and j and the border between them lies
exatly at B = 1
2
. With a tari t = 0, the result of this setup is familiar: eah
ompany will set pries equal to pi = pj = rs = r. The onsumer indierent
between purhasing from ountry i or from ountry j lies diretly at B = 1
2
,










in both ountries is then W = r + a− 5
4
r = a− 1
4
r.
Now a tari t ≥ 0 is introdued. The following proposition then an be
derived.
Proposition 3. With a tari t, there an be at most one symmetri equilib-
rium in pure strategies, with pries pi = pj = a− r2 .
Proof. Assume that an asymmetri prie equilibrium exists, suh that oun-
try j exports into ountry i (see Fig.4.5(b)). Then the indierent onsumer
in ountry i is given by:
a− pi − rxˆ = a− pj − t− r(1− xˆ)





(pj − pi + t),(4.17)
This leads to equilibrium pries being:
pi = r +
t
3
pj = r − t
3
,(4.18)








Alternatively, onsider a andidate for an asymmetri equilibrium de-
pited in solid lines in Fig.4.5(). Pries are suh that rms share the market
in half. Consider rm j's inentives. It has at least one protable devia-
tion from the solid prie shedule (as shown by the dashed prie shedule
in Fig.4.5()). Therefore, the solid prie shedule annot be an equilibrium.
The dashed prie shedule annot be an equilibrium, either, beause rm i
would now want to deviate.
Thus, onsider symmetri prie shedules in solid lines in Fig.4.5(d).
Clearly, rm i has at least one protable deviation (a dashed prie shedule),
so this annot be an equilibrium.
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i
j




















Fig. 4.5: Free trade and tari with two ountries
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Consider prie shedules depited in solid lines in Fig.4.5(e): phi = a −
r
2
, i = 1, 2. This equilibrium orresponds to the ollusive or monopoly
priing outome as it would also be obtained if the same rm oered its
produt in both ountries.
17
This is an equilibrium if a deviation is not protable. Inreasing pries
would lead to a loal monopoly outome where some onsumers in a ountry
would not be served, whih has been ruled out to be protable already with
free trade due to the assumption a ≥ 3
2
r18. When rm j dereases its prie,
the dashed line in Fig.4.5(e) represents the highest attainable prot. Firm






















For the prie p′j to be a suessful deviation strategy for j, it needs to be
by at least t smaller than pi = a− r2 beause otherwise no onsumer in i will







− t) ≤ a− r
2
− t,(4.21)
t ≥ a− 3
2
r,(4.22)
To onrm whether a deviation strategy is protable for j, we thus have
to ompare j's deviation prot with the ollusive prot. The ollusive prie









As the deviation prot π′j is stritly dereasing in t, we an analyze the
deviation strategy for the lowest possible t = a − 3
2
r given that this a >
3
2
r. The deviation prot π′j then beomes π
′
j(t = a − 32r) = 12r. Requiring








We thus label the equilibrium tc for ollusive given a tari.
18
See Ivanov and Müller (2006) for detailed disussion on this assumption and the
possibility of kink equilibria if it is relaxed.
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Thus, for all a > 3
2






Introduing a tari t ≥ a− 3
2
r then results in no trade as in the situation






Overall welfare in both ountries then is W h = 1
4
r + a − 1
2
r = a − 1
4
r.
Beause all onsumers are served and the average transportation ost does
not dier, overall welfare does not hange relative to the situation without
a tari. Yet the prie in eah ountry will inrease to the ollusive outome
and thus surplus is redistributed from onsumers to rms.
4.6 Appendix: One large and two small ountries - alulation
of prie equilibria
4.6.1 Collusive prie equilibrium before FTA




































































Note that given a > 3
2










There are three onditions that need to be met suh that the ollusive
equilibrium with trade between one large and two small ountries exists.
A. 1. (Trade ondition) Equilibrium pries allow trade, i.e. espeially i im-
ports from j and k respetively, i.e.
1
2
≤ xˆhij < B < 1
⇒ t < 4Br − 1
2
r − a.(4.26)
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A. 2. (Consumer's individual rationality) All onsumers onsume one of the
available produts, espeially the indierent onsumers in ountry i, i.e.
U(x = xˆhij, pj − t) = a− pj − t− rxˆhij > 0





A. 3. Firms have no inentive to deviate from the equilibrium and there is































r2 + 704ar − 224a2.(4.28)
Beause of ondition A.1 we known that a an not be too high, in fat
a ≤ 7
2
r as otherwise no positive t an fulll the ondition for any value of B.
Inserting a low a = 2r into the admissible range for t as given by A.3 yields
−23.3 < t < 26.9r. Thus in this ase A.2 is binding and requires a t < 1
6
r.
Instead also A.1 an be binding given B < 13
24
r. We onlude that a low a
and a suiently high B will always allow for a range of parameters t suh
that the ollusive equilibrium exists.
4.6.2 Competitive prie equilibrium before FTA
Finding the pries plj = p
l
k < a − 12r that are below the ollusive pries and
that an support an equilibrium requires solving the following rms' prot
funtions:
πj = πk =
1
2r
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As in the situation of the ollusive equilibrium, several onditions need
to me met suh that the ompetitive prie equilibrium is stable.




⇒ t > 13
2
r − 3a.(4.32)
A. 5. (Trade ondition) Equilibrium pries allow trade, i.e. espeially i im-
ports from j and k respeively, i.e.
1
2
< xˆlij < B < 1




A. 6. (Consumer's individual rationality) All onsumers onsume one of the
available produts, espeially the indierent onsumers in ountry i, i.e.
U(x = xˆlij , pj − t) = a− pj − t− rxˆlij > 0
⇒ t < 2a− 4r.(4.34)
A. 7. Firms have no inentive to deviate from the equilibrium. We rst
onsider a deviation upwards by t by the rm in ountry j . This would yield
the potentially highest prot for an upwards deviation whih is:
πj(p
l


















Deviating upwards by t yields a prot below the ompetitive equilibrium prot
















To uphold the equilibrium, the resulting prot needs to be lower than the prot
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We onlude that the ompetitive equilibrium exists only for values of t
that are larger than the values stated in ondition A.4 and ondition A.7 as
well as smaller than the values given by A.5 and A.6. A ommon range of
values for all the onditions exists for B > 2
3




r, i.e. when the
















, both the ollusive and the ompet-
itive equilibrium exist. The ollusive equilibrium then yields higher prots





4.6.3 Prie equilibrium after FTA
Abolishing the tari tjk indues ompetition between ountries j and k and
will thus generally redue pries. Reduing pries pj and pk is expeted to
lead to more imports from the small ountries j and k into i. Thus we solve:
πj = πk =
1
2r




(pj + pk − 2pi + 2t+ 2r) · pi
Equilibrium pries then are:
paj = p
a









































By omparing with Appendies 4.6.1 and 4.6.2, one an readily observe
that xˆaij < xˆ
h




ij . Thus, there are more imports
19
And onsequently for any t < 5r.
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from the small ountries j and k into i. Thus, when onditions A.1, A.2, A.5
and A.6 are fulllled, also the FTA equilibrium exists.
The omparison between the FTA equilibrium and the pre-FT ompeti-
tive equilibrium yields similar results as the omparison to the pre-FTA ol-
lusive equilibrium: Pries derease and imports M into ountry i inrease.
Fig.4.6 depits the two equilibria.
a











(a) Competitive tari (pre-FTA) equilibrium
a










Fig. 4.6: Pre-FTA and post-FTA equilibria with two small and one large ountry
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4.7 Appendix: Tables
Tab. 4.1: Cross-market prie orrelations for seleted ar
models and geographial markets. The models have been
seleted to have been in the European ar market for the
longest possible period of time (in the boundaries of 1970-
1999), and to represent dierent European ar produers.




Germany 0.99 0.98 1
Italy 0.97 0.97 0.98 1




Germany 0.98 0.95 1
Italy 0.89 0.93 0.91 1




Germany 0.98 0.98 1
Italy 0.92 0.94 0.96 1




Germany 0.98 0.95 1
Italy 0.89 0.93 0.91 1




Germany 0.99 0.95 1
Italy 0.93 0.93 0.93 1
UK 0.91 0.9 0.92 0.97 1
Continued on next page...
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... Tab. 4.1 ontinued




Germany 0.98 0.97 1
Italy 0.92 0.97 0.95 1




Germany 0.99 0.99 1
Italy 0.96 0.96 0.97 1




Germany 0.99 0.98 1
Italy 0.95 0.95 0.94 1




Germany 0.96 0.94 1
Italy 0.94 0.93 0.94 1




Germany 0.97 0.96 1
Italy 0.9 0.95 0.91 1
UK 0.8 0.88 0.81 0.94 1
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